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Economia Global e Gestão

versão impressa ISSN 0873-7444

Economia Global e Gestão v.13 n.3 Lisboa dez. 2008

 

Determinantes económicos da corrupção na União Europeia dos 15

Conceição Castro*

 

RESUMO: O combate à corrupção constitui um desafio importante, mesmo para as economias desenvolvidas, principalmente nesta era da globalização. Para o efeito, torna-se importante conhecer os principais factores, nomeadamente económicos, que determinam diferentes níveis de corrupção nas Administrações Públicas. Considerando os 15 Estados-membros da União Europeia, para os quais existem grandes divergências nos índices de percepção da corrupção, o objectivo é estabelecer correlações entre corrupção e diversos indicadores de rendimento, governação, liberdade económica e ética empresarial. Conclui-se que a honestidade dos burocratas e políticos está positivamente correlacionada com a eficácia governamental, maior qualidade da regulação, estabilidade política, voz e responsabilização, e maior liberdade económica. Adicionalmente, conclui-se que a componente legal da corrupção empresarial é relativamente mais relevante do que a componente ilegal e que se correlacionam positivamente com a percepção da corrupção na Administração Pública.

Palavras-chave: Corrupção, Governação, Liberdade Económica, Ética

 

TITLE: Economic Determinants of Corruption in the European Union (15 countries)

ABSTRACT: Controlling corruption is an important challenge namely to developed economies due to globalization. For the effect, it becomes important to know the main economic factors that determine different levels of corruption in the public administrations. Considering the 15 States Members of the European Union, for which there are great divergences in perception indexes of corruption, the objective is to establish correlations between corruption and different indicators of income, governance, economic freedom and ethics in business. The conclusions are that honesty of bureaucrats and politicians is correlated positively with governmental effectiveness, better quality of regulation, political stability, voice and accounting, and economic freedom. Additionally, we conclude that corporate legal corruption component is relatively more important than the corporate illegal corruption component and that they are also positively correlated with the perception of corruption in the public administration.

Keywords: Corruption, Governance, Economic Freedom, Ethics

 

 

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* Conceição Castro

conceicaocastro@eu.ipp.pt

Professora Adjunta na Escola Superior de Estudos Industriais e de Gestão (ESEIG) do Instituto Politécnico do Porto (IPP). Doutorada em Gestão.

PhD in Management. Adjunct Professor at Higher School of Industrial and Management Studies (ESEIG) of OPorto Polytechnic Institut.