Raciocínio contrafactual e modelos mentais (*)

 

 

Ruth M. J. Byrne (**)

Ana Cristina Quelhas (***)

 

 

RESUMO

A ideia central deste estudo é de que «... raciocinar sobre factos e raciocinar sobre possibilidades e impossibilidades, baseia-se nos mesmos tipos de representações mentais e processos cognitivos» (Byrne, 1997, p. 107). Quer dizer que as pessoas raciocinam atravésda construção e revisão de modelos mentais (e.g., Johnson-Laird, Byrne, 1991).

As condicionais contrafactuais requerem que os raciocinadores tenham em mente não apenas o que é suposto ser verdadeiro, mas também o que é supostamente verdadeiro mas factualmente falso (Byrne, 1997, p. 117; cf. Johnson-Laird, Byrne, 1991, pp. 72-73). E a hipótese de que a representação inicial de uma condicional contrafactual é mais explícita do que a de uma condicional factual, permite prever que as inferências Modus Tollens e Negação do Antecedente deverão ser feitas com maior frequência a partir das condicionais contrafactuais do que das factuais. Byrne e Tasso (in press) encontraram evidência para esta hipótese.

No estudo que apresentamos, também procuramos replicar esses resultados encontrados por Byrne e Tasso, e acrescentamos algumas hipóteses relacionadas com as latências para compreender os dois tipos de condicionais, e para escolher a conclusão. Utilizamos condicionais neutras do tipo «Se houve um círculo, então houve um triângulo», e apresentamos aos participantes os quatro silogismos condicionais no pro-grama SUPERLAB.

Palavras-chave: Raciocínio contrafactual, modelos mentais.

 

ABSTRACT

The central idea in this study is that «... thinking about matters of fact and thinking about matters of possibility and impossibility are based on similar sorts of mental representations and cognitive processes» (Byrne, 1997, p. 107). That is to say that people reason by constructing and revising mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991).

Counterfactual conditionals require reasoners to keep in mind not only what is presupposed to be true, but also what is suppositionally true but factually false (Byrne, 1997, p. 117; cf. Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991, pp. 72-73). And the hypothesis that the initial representation of a counterfactual conditional is more explicit than the initial representation of a factual conditional, allows the prediction that Modus Tollens and Denial of the Antecedent inferences would be made more frequently from the counterfactual than from the factual conditionals. Byrne and Tasso (in press) found evidence for those predictions.

In the present study, we look for replication of the data found by Byrne and Tasso, and we add some hypothesis related with the latencies to understand both kinds of conditionals, and to choose a conclusion. We use neutral conditionals like «If there was a circle, then there was a triangle», and we presented to participants the four conditional syllogisms in the SUPERLAB program.

Key words: Counterfactual reasoning, mental models.

 

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REFERÊNCIAS

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Byrne, R. M. J. (1997). Cognitive processes in counter-factual thinking about what might have been. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 37, 105-154.

Byrne, R. M. J., & Tasso, A. (in press). Reasoning from factual, hypothetical and counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition.

Byrne, R. M. J., Segura, S., Culhane, R., Tasso, A., & Berrocal, P. (in press). Counterfactual thinking and the temporality effect. Memory & Cognition.

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(*) Esta investigação é parcialmente subsidiada pelo Programa PRAXIS XXI, FCT.

(**) Dublin University, Ireland.

(***) Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, Lisboa.