Resumo

RODRIGUES, Jorge; SEABRA, Fernando  e  MATA, Carlos. Independence of Administrators in the banks quoted in the PSI20 . Rev. Portuguesa e Brasileira de Gestão [online]. 2008, vol.7, n.3, pp.34-42. ISSN 1645-4464.

The financial model of corporate governance assumes that the administrators run organizations according to the interests of their stockholders and not according to their individual interests. The main issue that is emphasized in the codes of best governance practices is the autonomy or independence of administrators, which we evaluate here as the total number of stocks held by the Board of Directors. Thus, it’s best if their private or individual interests are minimal in the organization. The main aim of this paper is to analyse if the concept of independence of administrators is recognizable in the bank sector in Portugal. To achieve our purpose we used case study methodology on a sample of three public subscription banks of the Portuguese Stock Index (PSI 20). Our results show that there is a possibility that managers, that are also shareholders, have a discretionary behaviour. This is due to the fact that they as an interested party do not hesitate to draw and execute policies according to shareholders demands, as suggested by agency theory. Consequently, their decision making being far from neutral has a direct impact on their personal wealth, thus contradicting the concept of independence we support.

Palavras-chave : Corporate Governance; Board of Directors; Independent Directors; Bank; Portuguese Stock Index 20.

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