Abstract

BYRNE, Ruth M. J.  and  QUELHAS, Ana Cristina. Raciocínio contrafactual e modelos mentais . Aná. Psicológica [online]. 1999, vol.17, n.4, pp.713-721. ISSN 0870-8231.

The central idea in this study is that «... thinking about matters of fact and thinking about matters of possibility and impossibility are based on similar sorts of mental representations and cognitive processes» (Byrne, 1997, p. 107). That is to say that people reason by constructing and revising mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991). Counterfactual conditionals require reasoners to keep in mind not only what is presupposed to be true, but also what is suppositionally true but factually false (Byrne, 1997, p. 117; cf. Johnson-Laird, & Byrne, 1991, pp. 72-73). And the hypothesis that the initial representation of a counterfactual conditional is more explicit than the initial representation of a factual conditional, allows the prediction that Modus Tollens and Denial of the Antecedent inferences would be made more frequently from the counterfactual than from the factual conditionals. Byrne and Tasso (in press) found evidence for those predictions. In the present study, we look for replication of the data found by Byrne and Tasso, and we add some hypothesis related with the latencies to understand both kinds of conditionals, and to choose a conclusion. We use neutral conditionals like «If there was a circle, then there was a triangle», and we presented to participants the four conditional syllogisms in the SUPERLAB program.

Keywords : Counterfactual reasoning; mental models.

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