Portugal and Spain had had a very different relationship with Europe from the start of the European integration process in the 1950s, and it was only after both countries joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 that the two converged.

In light of the European Union’s current enlargement policy, the Iberian enlargement may be a source of nostalgia as it was an event of great importance at the time for both States; in addition to their full integration in the EEC, bilateral relations between the two countries were improved.

As celebrations take place for the 30th anniversary of the Act of Accession, we make a further contribution to the study of Portugal’s accession to the EEC by returning to the “Siamese negotiations” concept and the way in which Member States capitalised on this enlargement.

In fact, Portugal’s accession to the EEC came up against two main obstacles. Spain was the first of these because Portugal was held back by the simultaneity of their accession processes. The economic challenge Spain posed for the EEC and the Member States resulted in several pauses in negotiations, which also affected the progress of Portuguese negotiations. On the other hand, Portugal became a “prisoner” of this application. Not only could it have joined sooner because it was the first to request membership, albeit a mere four months before Spain, but it was always ahead in negotiations, even if only a little; and its accession raised fewer and smaller problems.

**Abstract**

This article focuses on the Portuguese application for membership to the European Economic Community, seeking to demonstrate that Portuguese accession was delayed as a result of the simultaneity of Portugal and Spain’s accession negotiations. It also analyses the fact that although Member States were theoretically in favour of further enlargement, they dealt with the process at their own pace, and in accordance with their own specific requirements; we therefore show how the interests of the Member States conditioned the accession process.

**Keywords**: European Economic Community, Iberian enlargement, Portugal, Spain.
The other obstacle concerns the way in which the Member States capitalised on the third enlargement, orchestrating it to obtain benefits for themselves. In fact, the Member States’ progressive takeover of the enlargement policy was such that people spoke of the “creeping nationalisation” of the policy, immediately compromising both its credibility and its efficiency. And although the enlargement process can be considered a political process underpinned by several economic, social and geopolitical factors, it was ultimately the value of fruit, of vegetables, olive oil, and wine that mattered because these issues do in fact sow discord among Member States.

This article focuses on the Portuguese application, seeking to demonstrate that Portugal’s accession was delayed as a result of the simultaneity of Portugal and Spain’s accession negotiations, and that although the Member States were theoretically in favour of the new enlargement, they dealt with the process at their own pace and in line with their own and very specific requirements. We will therefore attempt to show how the Member States’ interests conditioned the entire negotiation process.

THE BACKGROUND TO NEGOTIATIONS

After the Second World War, Portugal took the path of international cooperation with membership of the OECD, EFTA, and NATO, whereas Spain limited its participation to the OECD from 1958 and to technical-type international organisations. The first years of European integration were “indecisive years” for Spain, and it was only in 1962 that it gave any real consideration to participating in this project. Juan Carlos Pereira Castañares and Antonio Moreno Juste note that Spain’s rapprochement to Europe changed status between the Second World War and Franco’s death, going from a “minor” (1949-1955) to an “average” political matter (1957-1962) and then finally to a “priority” political matter (from 1962). Political decisions on the issue of European integration were only made after this and there were several attempts to establish relations with the EEC. Spain only succeeded in doing so in 1970 with the signing of a trade agreement established within the scope of the EEC’s trade relations with Mediterranean countries.

Under Portugal’s Estado Novo, the European construction project was limited to its economic aspect, and Portugal simultaneously distanced itself from and was kept away from the political side due to the authoritarian regime in power. However, attempts were made to “establish means for both parties to collaborate” on two different occasions: first in 1962 and again in 1969, with the latter resulting in the signing of trade agreements in 1972.
In both Portugal and Spain, the non-democratic regimes prevented any political arrangement with the EEC. This situation changed in the mid-1970s with the 25th April Revolution in Portugal in 1974, and the death of General Franco in Spain in 1975, when the institutional mechanisms were set in motion in both countries that ultimately led to the application for membership to the EEC: the Portuguese on 28th March 1977, and the Spanish on 26th July of that same year.

The underlying reasons for the request for membership were the same in both cases, notably the need to consolidate the democratic regime (democratisation), and to boost their respective economies (trade relations), which were heavily dependent on the markets of the EEC Member States; and also social reasons (a large number of emigrants in the Member States). In this respect, the EEC was considered a source of political security (against any dictatorial temptation) as well as economic security (through development aid).

Once the application for membership was made, both countries were faced with the following question: now that a democratic regime was in place following free elections and there were political parties and democratic institutions, when and under what conditions would they be accepted as Member States. This came in the broader context of the Cold War, in which the Portuguese and Spanish transition processes could tip the balance of influences in Europe if the communist parties were to obtain too much power in the new democratic regimes. It was therefore important for the western block to guarantee stability on the Iberian Peninsula and for the EEC to support the two States in their democratisation processes.

In both cases, some months elapsed (19 for Portugal, and 18 for Spain) between the application for membership and the official opening of negotiations. Over these months, bilateral meetings were held at various levels (with representatives of the respective governments and community institutions, including diplomats from the various Member States, Commission experts) in preparation for future negotiations and they were able to draw on the experience of the first enlargement process (1973) and that of Greece, which was ongoing at the time.

Whereas the Greek negotiation process took just two years, Portuguese and Spanish negotiations lasted seven, thanks to the Spanish application more than that of Portugal. Thirty years after accession, António Martha recently confirmed that if negotiations had not taken place simultaneously, Portugal’s accession would have taken two years. In fact, it is known that Spanish accession was not an “easy, swift, or smooth task”, and it had repercussions on Portugal’s accession, as we will see below.

**THE PARALLELISM PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATIONS**

In all seven rounds of enlargement to date, the accession process was always (and still is) unique for each candidate State. Despite running parallel to each other, the Spanish and Portuguese negotiations had both similarities and differences. The similarities are
evident in the visits made to the capital cities of the Member States by Prime Ministers Mário Soares and Adolfo Suárez in 1977 to gather support for their application for membership. The successive governments of both countries repeated these visits to ensure that the Member States would not forget the “enlargement portfolio”. Negotiations were conducted by several governments (in Portugal, the accession portfolio saw nine constitutional governments; Spain saw four), formed by different political parties (Partido Socialista, Partido Popular Democrático and Centro Democrático Social, in the case of Portugal; Unión de Centro Democrático and Partido Socialista Obrero Español - PSOE, in the case of Spain). In fact, in the Portuguese case, the two governments led by Mário Soares were responsible for both applying for membership and signing the accession treaty, while in Spain, Filipe González finished what Adolfo Suárez had started. Another similarity is that the negotiations for accession in both countries were conducted by a small team of diplomats and experts (about 20 in each team), and any changes to this team were to the political leader of the negotiations rather than at the technical level. The number of Conference meetings also converged, with a total of 32 ministerial meetings for Spain and 27 for Portugal, and 31-32 Deputy meetings; reaching an agreement on the chapters of agriculture, fisheries and social affairs was much more difficult for Portugal, while Spain had problems with agriculture, social affairs, industry and foreign affairs.

In terms of differences, in Spain the application for accession became a national matter supported by all political parties represented in the Parliament – unprecedented in any of the Member States and used as a show of strength to the outside. In contrast, the application did not have unanimous support in Portugal’s Assembly of the Republic from the outset and was opposed by the Communist Party (a stance that would last throughout the whole negotiation process, ending with a vote against the ratification of the Act of Accession). On the other hand, whereas there was not much participation from business associations and unions in Portugal, those responsible for the negotiations in Spain had 175 work sessions with business and union organisations, 210 sectoral meetings and four seminars for journalists between February 1979 and October 1982.

The accession negotiations for Portugal started on 17th October 1978 and 5th February 1979 for Spain. The political conclusion was reached on 29th March 1985, and the technical conclusion on 7th June and subsequently formalised with the signing of the Act of Accession on 12th June that same year. Over this long period, the parallelism and the globalisation of negotiations was a frequent topic and common to all those involved. The three applications (including that of Greece) for EEC membership were phased and the accession process therefore developed accordingly; hence, Roy Jenkins, then President of the European Commission, believed that although negotiations with candidates would not take place in parallel and it was agreed they would not be done jointly, the three applications would inevitably come up against similar problems. The Council reaffirmed this when it stated that negotiations should also be based on the principle of the merits of each candidate, even though there were certain inter-relations.
between the three applications”. Vanessa Núñez Peñas has a different understanding of the matter, defending that “the political, institutional and economic consequences of the accession to the south [of Europe] were analysed from a global perspective from the outset, even though the Commission’s opinions on the membership of each candidate were prepared in a bilateral manner”\textsuperscript{18}. And even on the Portuguese side, it was known beforehand that “while some countries favour holding negotiations with new candidates individually, others prefer to globalise these negotiations”\textsuperscript{19}.

Moreover, during the phase of sounding out political-diplomatic opinions, Greece did not want its application to be linked in any way to that of Portugal (which would stall its accession process), and similarly Portugal did not want its application connected to that of Spain which was still being prepared. A link with the Greek application would allow Portugal to gain time and would be more advantageous in negotiations; the link with Spain would have the opposite effect, as was later verified.

With regard to this matter, Portugal always rejected any globalised negotiations with either Greece or Spain; it advocated bilateral and individual negotiations, not only because of the specific economic problems of each candidate, but also because of the stage of democratic development; Mário Soares had stated this even before the application for membership had been made\textsuperscript{20}. In 1983, already more than halfway through negotiations, an intervention from the Minister of Finance and Budget Planning, João Salgueiro, at an INTEREUROPA conference (Portuguese Association for the Study of European Integration) referred to the parallelism of Portugal and Spain’s negotiations with the EEC; he explained that “the Portuguese government’s position has always been clear, it has been the same from the start and there is no reason to change it”\textsuperscript{21}, namely, negotiations based on the country’s own merits.

The “commitment to the principle of ‘non-globalised’ negotiations” was unremitting, with the Portuguese side fighting for each application to be assessed on the basis of its specificities, own merits, and with its own calendar\textsuperscript{22}; it tried to distance itself from the Spanish negotiations, defending a vision of autonomy and national sovereignty, especially in relation to Spain\textsuperscript{23}. And although negotiations were in effect conducted individually, they could hardly be independent of each other; so in the end, the theory of “our application was made first and we should be the first to access”\textsuperscript{24} did not hold true.

Although Portugal had always stated its wish to join before Spain, it was generally understood from 1980 that this was beyond its reach as it was not what the Member States wanted; they were cautious about concessions made to Portugal throughout negotiations so as not to “contaminate” concessions to be made to Spain\textsuperscript{25}. In contrast
to Spain, Portugal had few, if any, agricultural or industrial sectors that seriously threatened the EEC. However, by “taking a relatively passive position in the negotiations, the Portuguese became vulnerable to the problems found in the Spanish negotiations”\textsuperscript{26}. As a result, the Portuguese were quite constrained about openly criticising the EEC; the strategy of the Spanish government was quite different, and it manifested its disapproval on several occasions when negotiations stalled.

In fact, Spain also wanted the two applications to be formally separated, even if only in principle. On the one hand, it defended that “each application should be analysed separately in line with its circumstances and own merits”, but on the other, it was clearly understood that “if we distance ourselves too much from the others, we risk them joining because their cases are relatively straightforward; and if we arrive months or even years later, at the wrong time and isolated, circumstances could have got worse and our accession could be vetoed for one reason or another”\textsuperscript{27}. This fear of negotiations with Portugal evolving faster than Spain’s and of enlargement taking place in two phases lasted until almost the end of the negotiations and was even the reason for growing tensions in the bilateral relations between the two countries.

While the candidates wanted their applications to be dissociated from each other and, thus, separate accessions, the Member States did not share this position. France was the first Member State to speak of a “Europe of the Twelve”, which would include Spain. Portugal suffered because of this from the start as its application became involved in the problems the EEC faced mainly from Spain. On the other hand, the Federal Republic of Germany had never accepted Portugal’s accession on its own. This is how Francisco Pinto Balsemão summarised the problem:

“You’d go to Bonn, they’d say: «You’re in tomorrow; but the Spanish have to be in too. It’s nothing to do with us. But it’s the French that don’t want the Spanish in. So go to Paris and tell the French to let the Spanish in.» We’d go to Paris (...) and the French would say: «We have no problem with you joining now, but try to convince the Germans that you can join on your own, that you don’t need to wait for the Spanish. You see, it’s more complicated with the Spanish»”\textsuperscript{28}.

Any idea of playing Bonn against Paris was doomed to fail however, and it was equally dangerous to attempt to set an accession date (although the Portuguese government was particularly expeditious in this case); so the Portuguese and Spanish governments had to use their resources effectively to unblock and speed up negotiations. Diogo Freitas do Amaral and António Martha agreed with Pinto Balsemão, and Diogo Freitas do Amaral added that from a community standpoint, “the problem of Portugal’s integration is a problem for Portugal; Spain’s integration in Europe is a problem for the EEC”\textsuperscript{29}.

Even the Commission had decided, albeit informally, that accession would take place simultaneously\textsuperscript{30}, which would result in the slow pace of negotiations. It did so not only
because joint accession was “administratively easier”\textsuperscript{31}, but also because of its experience of the first enlargement and because it was unaware of the delicate bilateral relations between the two countries\textsuperscript{32}. Indeed, with the exception of Greece and more recently Croatia, two or more States joined at the same time in all the enlargement rounds. Payno noted that although this enlargement round involved three States, it was seen as a single process, and that Brussels had a tendency to “globalise” enlargement and to generalise some candidates’ problems to others\textsuperscript{33}. Furthermore, “timing and geography meant that, contrary to Greece, there was no realistic possibility of Portugal approaching the EC on its own”\textsuperscript{34}. On the other hand, the argument that it would be politically and administratively impossible for the two States to join at different times due to logistic problems, such as integrating the countries’ staff in the European institutions, did not work.

It was extremely frustrating for the Portuguese and Spanish delegations, in part due to difficulties in understanding the fact that the political aim of accession – the consolidation of the democratic regimes – was not enough to conclude negotiations\textsuperscript{35}, which also entailed various economic consequences. Indeed, France had treated the two applications quite differently from the start, as it was aware of the many points of competition between the French and Spanish economies\textsuperscript{36}, and therefore foresaw more negotiation problems with Spain than with Portugal. Hence, throughout negotiations various key French politicians such as François Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac, Georges Marchais, and others less well known, expressed opinions of a clearly nationalist bent that were not aligned with the pro-European spirit. Raimundo Bassols even cites the colourful example of MP Pierre Guidoni when he was referring to the possible Iberian enlargement that “democracy is one thing; fruit, wine and vegetables is quite another”\textsuperscript{37}, something that has also been confirmed by literature\textsuperscript{38}.

If Portugal had presented its application for membership alone, the matter might not have been resolved, but it would have been put well on track. However, the Spanish application made it difficult to separate the two. It was also known that the Spanish application involved economic problems that Portugal did not have: Spanish agriculture was very competitive with the agriculture in southern France; some industries, notably steelworks and the car industry, were also competitive with French counterparts; moreover, there were many American multinational companies in Spain that could represent a “threat” to the EEC’s customs protection. In contrast, the Portuguese GDP was only 1\% of the total GDP of the EEC, and the Portuguese economy would therefore have minimal impact on the EEC, and even that of Spain would not be very significant. Nevertheless, the Portuguese application would remain “hostage” to that of Spain until the very end.

This was not, however, the first time Spain came between Portugal and the EEC: in 1962, the unexpected Spanish application for membership raised a series of objections from European socialist parties, and the Portuguese government was advised to let “the dust
raised by the Spanish request] settle” and present its application as late as possible. Years later, in 1976-1977, news that the Spanish application for membership was imminent accelerated Portugal’s application. The parallel negotiations and inseparable nature of the two applications were therefore a constant and posed an obstacle that Portugal could not overcome. Ultimately, it was not within its reach to do so. In addition, there was another obstacle that was no less important to the progress of negotiations: the instrumentalisation of enlargement so that the Member States could capitalise on benefits that were in their national interest.

**CAPITALISING ON ENLARGEMENT**

Following the not so successful enlargement experiences in recent years, due to the candidate’s inadequate preparation or membership being unsustainable (in the case of Bulgaria, for example), some adjustments have been made that have strengthened the Member States’ control over this policy. Moreover, the Member States themselves have also “had fewer scruples in instrumentalising enlargement to obtain national political gains”41. This was already the case at the time of the Iberian enlargement and allowed it to become hostage to national political and economic agendas.

Although each enlargement process entails gains for both old and new Member States, here the Iberian enlargement process was successful despite Member States having reservations due to the expected conflicts on the respective distribution of benefits. Christina Schneider, who analyses distribution conflicts in enlargement processes, argues that the successive enlargement rounds have materialised in spite of these conflicts because it is believed that access to the market and the geopolitical benefits resulting from integration outweigh the loss of political sovereignty, an opinion shared by economists and political scientists. And on the other hand, as defended by sociologists, European integration is an almost natural process motivated by common values and by socialisation42.

In the early 1980s, the EEC was committed to implementing structural reforms as this was fundamental for its compliance with its internal and external obligations related to enlargement43. Therefore, the enlargement process and the strengthening of common policies had to be pursued in parallel and simultaneously, but the former could never be a condition for the latter44. In short, there was a common and enduring concern that strengthening had to come before enlarging (deepening vs. enlargement). This need for further development alongside the reform of institutions and common policies proved a clear obstacle in the context of negotiations. However, it was not the only one. A ‘cocktail’ of factors conditioned the negotiations: a politically weak Commission until the Jacques Delors presidency; French President François Mitterrand wanted a “race for growth” while looking out for French farmers’ interests; the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, insisted on a budget rebate; and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was out of control45.
The new enlargement only added to this scenario, but it was the Member States’ least important concern by far even though it heightened the tension among them and took up time and effort. Moreover, we know that the enlargement policy has become increasingly politicised and the process continues to be predominantly political.

There was real concern that the enlargement process could endanger the EEC’s economic accomplishments and the cohesion of the single market, and also that the EEC could be weakened by enlargement, putting its fundamental objectives at risk.

On the other hand, while enlargement would not in fact pose a new major problem for either the Community structure or its capacity to function, it would exacerbate the existing problems in agriculture, industry and the regions, and highlight the urgency and importance of making structural reforms. Nevertheless, apart from these more technical matters, there was no reason to refuse the candidates’ membership. Even so, the Member States’ ability to delay any accession process cannot be underestimated. This was clearly demonstrated by the Iberian enlargement.

While Spain was to blame for the delay in the Portuguese negotiation process, France’s position delayed that of Spain; it is thought France conducted the Spanish accession process to suit the pace of its own domestic policy, and its actions during the process were “considered from the start to be more in line with a campaign by the major parties to attract votes than a strategy in the scope of the French European policy.” An interesting example of this delay – and its inherent complexity – was the fact that a little over half of all the negotiations (eight years) was taken up solely with the “vue d’ensemble” phase, and so the assessment of Spain’s level of preparation for membership was only concluded in the first half of 1982.

At first, electioneering was in fact an explanation for the position of the French party leaders (Jacques Chirac and Georges Marchais, for example), particularly during the legislative elections in March 1978. Protecting the interests of French farmers was what mattered at the time (especially those in the south of France, considered the most conservative) in light of the consequences of Spain’s accession. Later, in 1982, Raimundo Bassols – member of the Spanish negotiating team from 1977 to 1982 – was under the impression that “Mitterrand’s inventory” was a means of stalling the negotiations and triggering early elections so that the PSOE party (socialists) could win and continue with the accession.

Nevertheless, the positions varied and France’s main political parties were divided between Giscard’s «opportunist yes» and the communists’ «categorical no», the «cautious yes» of Mitterrand’s socialists and Chirac’s «not now». This refusal, however,
was more a campaign issue for the parties from the political spectrum than for the French in general who were not opposed to enlargement. Moreover, it could lead to the emergence of anti-French feeling in Spain, which would be prejudicial for France after accession. Curiously, Vanessa Núñez Peñas defends that the consequences of France being seen as the main (and almost only) obstacle to Spanish accession actually affected Spanish-French bilateral relations more than the negotiations between Spain and the Community; this of course, from our perspective, if we do not take into consideration the successive delays due to French requests, namely “Giscard’s European re-launch” – known as “Giscardazo” in Spain – and “Mitterrand’s inventory”.

In fact, on a number of occasions one (or more) Member State only allowed the enlargement process to advance if certain conditions were satisfied, because everyone wanted something: the Nordic countries wanted the reform of the institutions; Italy and France wanted the reform of the CAP; the United Kingdom wanted the contribution to the community budget to be reviewed; Luxemburg and the Federal Republic of Germany wanted limits set on the free circulation of workers (Portuguese workers in the first case, and Spanish in the latter); Ireland wanted access to community funds; and, towards the end, Greece wanted an increase in the funds for Mediterranean agricultural products.

Let us look at some of these in more detail.

In the early 1970s, the institutions created under the Rome Treaty were already showing some weaknesses, and the possibility of enlargement would therefore provide the necessary final impetus for institutional reform. However, the Member States’ reading of the matter varied: while the BENELUX countries, Italy and Ireland questioned the potential implications of enlargement at an institutional level, France and the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser degree, the Federal Republic of Germany were content with the status quo. The smaller countries, particularly the BENELUX countries, were particularly concerned about the weakening of Community institutions, which would lead to an increase in the power of larger countries. This issue was raised specifically in the scope of enlargement on more than one occasion because there was a risk that institutions would deteriorate and might not be able to guarantee an efficient decision-making process in an enlarged community; this had already been the case with the enlargement from six to nine Member States. But it was still in its early stages and it dragged on until the end of the accession negotiations and beyond; it was only concluded with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986.

Under the pretext of a “European re-launch” – which suggests the consolidation and development of common policies, and the improved functioning of the EEC and of
cooperation between institutions –, the French President, Giscard d’Estaing put the enlargement process “on hold” on 13th October 1981. This triggered distinct reactions. The Portuguese government understood that the French President had not expressed any opposition to Portuguese accession, but had simply defended the need for a pause in the enlargement process without setting deadlines, and therefore negotiations would proceed with the agreed agenda. This was a cause for concern in Spain for months because, as Raimundo Bassols suggested, “if Greece were to join first and without any problems, and Portugal managed to get round being put ‘on hold’ and were free of us, the Spanish application could be seriously compromised and even open to a future French veto if negotiations were not well managed or there was too much internal pressure.” In mid-1982, with François Mitterrand already in the French Presidency, an inventory was requested of the problems related to the enlargement in terms of both community policies and for each Member State. This was presented in the same year but it did not add anything essential and was considered “a way of France transferring the responsibility of its own problems with enlargement to the Community as a whole, given that the different problems were already known and had been extensively analysed.”

In terms of problem solving (or at least working towards a solution), the outcomes of the Stuttgart European Council (17-19 June, 1983) are worthy of note. In addition to examining the major dossiers that had been pending for years (enlargement, funding, CAP reform, and new common policies), the “Stuttgart Mandate” was approved at the Council. This Mandate served to launch negotiations to resolve the financial problems related to the third enlargement. Between June and December that year, seven special European Council meetings were convened to discuss a number of problems related to the CAP, the structural funds, competitiveness, and EEC funding. They resulted in the reform of the CAP, and the approval of the fruit and vegetable regime – France’s struggle supported by Italy and Greece –, which increased the subsidies for Mediterranean agriculture after the Nordic States agreed to increase resources for agriculture in the hope that enlargement would bring two new markets as outlets for their industrial products.

The United Kingdom was already the second largest net contributor to the community budget in 1977, coming second after the Federal Republic of Germany, and it was expected to become the largest net contributor once the transition period ended in 1980. However, the problem was not the contribution it made but the amount it received in return. The Federal Republic of Germany was the only other Member State that received less than it contributed, but the difference was minimal. Meanwhile, a “correction mechanism” had been created and the amount of the United Kingdom rebate had been decided upon; but Margaret Thatcher, who had been elected Prime Minister in May 1979, did not accept the Commission’s proposal to reimburse 350 million pounds, proposing one billion. She maintained this position for the following four and a half
years, during which time there was agreement on several temporary rebates but no final agreement was reached. Over this period, the United Kingdom also started to hamper progress in other areas because its demand had not been met. This is when the political rhetoric in favour of consolidating democracy in the south of Europe started to wane, even though Margaret Thatcher herself continued to manifest the “British Government’s strong support” for enlargement and the inclusion of Portugal and Spain. This issue was only resolved at the European Council in Fontainebleau (25-26 June 1984), when an agreement was finally reached on the amount of the United Kingdom’s compensation vis-à-vis its contribution towards the Community budget. This agreement also opened the way for the implementation of two others: on the increase in own resources raising the ceiling on VAT to 1.4%, and budgetary and financial discipline.

In the final phase of the negotiations when technical and policy issues had been concluded, Greece’s intention to veto Portuguese and Spanish membership loomed large because, as a recent Member State, it feared a transfer of funds (structural support) to these two less developed States, and wanted its rights to be guaranteed. This threat of the veto was overcome with the creation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP), from which Greece, Italy and France would benefit, and Ireland ensured that this programme would not affect the transfers to the less prosperous regions of the EEC.

Christina Schneider claims that candidates and Member States negotiate the distribution of the enlargement’s earnings and losses among themselves; and the European Union is enlarged despite major distributive conflicts when some members (those that can veto the membership of new members) are compensated for their anticipated losses. She adds that it is the States with the most to lose that have an incentive to delay negotiations and can use their power to veto (enlargement requires unanimity) either explicitly or implicitly; even the Member States with the most to gain from enlargement encourage them, compensating them with other benefits so as to cover those losses. In the case of the Iberian enlargement, for example, France and Italy supported enlargement but wanted compensation within the scope of the CAP.

Diogo Freitas do Amaral notes that during the negotiations “there was no notion of friend-enemy” but, in his opinion, they were conducted based on the “wrong overall conception, insofar as they want to help everyone a little and so everything is distributed”. Agreement came from the Spanish on this when referring that the Member States not only got everything they wanted from the candidates, but also that what they granted depended on their good-will.
CONCLUSION

The Portuguese and Spanish waited in desperation as negotiations slowly proceeded. The Iberian enlargement negotiations took place in an atmosphere of Euro-pessimism, a lack of political willingness, and a revival of intergovernmentalism, which contributed to negotiations dragging on and ultimately made technical and economic obstacles easier to overcome than the political ones.

It was the internal problems of the Community together with the national political scenario in each Member State that determined the pace of negotiations, irrespective of Portugal and Spain’s own domestic interests (which were mostly sidelined) and the difficulties raised by each application. Although negotiations never formally came to a standstill, their progress was aligned with the EEC’s internal developments; notably, there was no chance of concluding the agriculture chapter until the CAP reform had been completed.

It is not easy to establish a direct correlation between the Spanish negotiations’ influence on Portuguese negotiations because meetings were bilateral (between the Member States and the candidate); however, it is easy to ascertain that Portugal did not conclude its accession chapters until Spain did so. The way the EEC as a whole and some individual Member States viewed Spain’s economic strength was the underlying reason for this; on the other hand, from a political perspective, the EEC was not prepared to go through two enlargement rounds, one for Portugal and another for Spain. Indeed, although the EEC publicly defended the theory of the “merit of the candidates”, the negotiations actually ran parallel to each other and accession was simultaneous; and the Federal Republic of Germany’s position on the simultaneous accession of the two Iberian States was intransigent.

Ultimately, the completion of the enlargement process depended primarily on the resolution of two main issues, namely the contribution to the community budget and the CAP reform, and on two of the Member States giving their agreement on these issues (Germany to support the cost of the accession, and France to accept the CAP reform); if we put everything else aside, Portugal was indeed a “victim” of Spain’s difficulties, and its negotiations could only be concluded after the more complicated problems between the EEC and Spain were resolved. There can be no doubt that Portugal could easily have joined the EEC about three years earlier if its application had not been associated with that of Spain.

In the end, no one was responsible for the delay in the negotiations but everyone gained from enlargement. Using “dragging” tactics, or even of “freezing” as a question of affirmation, the Member States obtained more favourable conditions without having to bear the weight of cancelling the enlargement. Ultimately, the interests of every Member State prevailed: the resolution of the contribution for the community budget to the liking of the United Kingdom; the setting up of the MIP, which pleased Greece, Italy and France, with France also achieving the CAP reform; the reform of the institutions,
which pleased the BENELUX countries; and the simultaneous accession of Portugal and Spain, as had been West Germany’s wish. Thus, the Member States openly capitalised on the enlargement as their demands were met and Portugal and Spain were well aware of this.

TRANSLATION BY: RACHEL EVANS

Date received: 27\textsuperscript{th} July, 2015 | Date approved: 15\textsuperscript{th} September, 2015

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This paper was first published in Relaciones Internacionales no.48, December 2015.

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9 Testimony by António Martha, on 4th June 2015, as part of the Series of Conferences “Memórias da Adesão de Portugal à CEE” [Memories of Portugal’s Accession to the EEC].

10 BASSOLLS, Raimundo - España en Europa..., op. cit., p. 1.

11 In Portugal, negotiations were managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Ministry of European Integration, and the Ministry of Finance and Budget Planning, and in Spain by the Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores and the Ministerio para las Relaciones con las Comunidades Europeas, the latter converted to State Department in February 1981. Regarding the Portuguese and Spanish negotiation structure, see: CUNHA, Alice - O Alargamento Ibérico..., op. cit., pp. 91-100; NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la ampliación (1976-1986): las negociaciones hispano-comunitarias en tiempos de transición y aproximadose. Madrid: Complutense University of Madrid, 2013, pp. 447-449, respectively.

12 The Conference was the official name adopted for the number of intergovernmental meetings that took place between the Member States and the candidate countries within the scope of the accession negotiations.


15 BASSOLLS, Raimundo - España en Europa..., op. cit., p. 237.


18 NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la ampliación..., op. cit., p. 133.

19 Fundação Mário Soares Archives, Folder 837, “Reações ao pedido de adesão de Portugal às Comunidades Europeias”, written by Fernando d’Oliveira Neves, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EDI, dated 10th February, 1977, p. 3.


24 President António Ramalho Eanes, on his visit to Strasbourg, when making a speech to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, on 9th May 1984, demanded that the applications be separated as the more difficult problems of the Portuguese application had largely been solved. Historical Archives of the European Union, CPPE-001655, “Portugal Demands Priority”, Financial Times, 10 May 1984.


27 BASSOLLS, Raimundo - España en Europa..., op. cit., p. 212.

28 BRITO, José María Brandão de, AMARAL, João Ferreira do e ROLLO, Maria Fernanda - Portugal e a Europa - Testemunhos dos Protagonistas. Lisbon: Tinta de China, 2011, testimony by Francisco Pinto Balsemão, pp. 138-139.

29 Interview with Diogo Freitas do Amaral, on 21st June, 2011; Interview with António Martha, on 8th August, 2011.

30 See, for example, HIBOU, Béatrice - «Greece and Portugal...», op. cit., p. 231.


34 PRESTON, Christopher - Enlargement and Integration..., op. cit., p. 81.

35 Not even Spain’s attempted coup d’état on 23 February 1981 – the so-called “23-F”
that confirmed the problems in the Spanish democratization process –, which the Member States strongly condemned, resulted in an urgent policy to accelerate negotiations given the event and the undeniable link between accession and democratisation.


37 BASSOLS, Raimundo, España en Europa..., op. cit., p. 194.


39 AHQ, EOI M. 210, telegram received from the Brussels Embassy, dated 27 April 1962.


41 HILLION, Christophe - The Creeping Nationalisation..., op. cit., p. 6.


44 AHCE, BAC 250/1980 no. 64, "Briefing Note for President Jenkins, Venice Summit Meeting: Enlargement – President Giscard’s remarks", 10 June 80.


48 NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la ampliación..., op. cit., p. 175. Joint view of the application aimed at understanding in detail the difficulties and the problems for all parties in each chapter.

49 NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la ampliación..., op. cit., pp. 177-178.

50 NÚÑEZ PEÑAS, Vanessa - Entre la reforma y la ampliación..., op. cit., p. 234 [and 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 of chapter 4].

51 See, in particular, CUNHA, Alice - O Alargamento Ibérico..., op. cit., p. 74.


59 SCHNEIDER, Christina J. - Conflict, negotiation..., op. cit., p. 183.

60 Interview with Diogo Freitas do Amaral, on 21st June, 2011.

61 ALONSO, Antonio - España en el Mercado Común..., op. cit., p. 197.

62 Proof of this was the fact that the last Deputy meeting for Spain took place on 28th May 1984, but negotiations were only concluded at a political level at the end of March 1985, showing that from a technical point of view, there was nothing else that needed to be dealt with, and almost a year elapsed before political decisions were reached.

63 As Raimundo Bassols parodied, the Commission placed responsibility on the Council, the Council on the European Parliament, the European Parliament, in turn, on the Commission, Commissioner “x” on Commissioner “y”, and Commissioner “y” on Board of Directors “a” or “b”, Italy thought France was responsible, France blamed the Netherlands, and the Netherlands the “decision-making system”. BAS-SOLS, Raimundo – España en Europa..., op. cit., p. 236.


BRITO, José Maria Brandão de, AMARAL, João Ferreira do e ROLLO, Maria Fernanda - Portugal e a Europa - Testemunhos dos Protagonistas. Lisboa: Tinta da China, 2011, testimony by Francisco Pinto Balsemão.


