Philanthropy without borders: Calouste Gulbenkian’s founding vision for the Gulbenkian Foundation

Established on his death in 1955, the Armenian oil magnate Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian’s eponymous foundation enjoys a high profile in the cultural life of Lisbon and Portugal as a whole. Gulbenkian’s correspondence as well as that which passed among Cyril Radcliffe, José de Azeredo Perdigão, and others involved in helping plan and then establish the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation indicates that the parameters of the latter’s activities were much fought over in its early years. The course set by the Foundation under Salazar’s dictatorship does not reflect the benefactor’s original intentions, which anticipated more recent models of charitable giving in their scope and dynamism.

Keywords: philanthropy; Antonio Salazar; Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

Charity, they say, begins at home. Although we still lack an adequate survey of the historical development of philanthropy in western Europe and North America, it is clear that philanthropy has tended to define its beneficiaries as members of the same parish, city, or guild as the philanthropist. In the sixteenth century the churches of Reformation Europe used printed propa-
ganda to expand its horizons to include co-religionists. During the Counter-Reformation they were further broadened to include members of other ethnic groups, understood as prospective co-religionists whom Providence wished to lift out of “darkness”. The “beneficiaries” of this first wave of global philanthropy often had little say in the matter, leading anti-clerical *philosophes* of the Enlightenment to wonder which side represented “darkness”, Christian Europeans or the “noble savages” of the expanding European empires. David Hume, Adam Smith, and Edmund Burke went even further, questioning whether pure, disinterested love of all humanity was desirable or even possible.

The universal humanitarianism postulated by Francis Hutcheson seemed cold, “calculating”, and remote from those more narrowly-confined social passions that connected neighbour to neighbour. Only these passions could, they argued, serve as the basis for effective philanthropy, building outwards from Burke’s “little platoon” to embrace the village, the county and — though it could seem unlikely that there would be enough philanthropy to stretch quite this far — the nation. Of course many charitable institutions were established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but behind the rhetoric of “public-spirited” benefactors these institutions’ catchment largely remained restricted to a parish, city, or county. Censured by local notables as central government administration run wild, nineteenth-century steps toward state provision of education, health, and other public services sought to even out the gaps in this patchwork. They also served to increase popular loyalty to the regime itself. Localized, often church-based philanthropy could be perceived by the latter as an obstacle that needed to be removed before a “professional” and “rational” state welfare system could be established. The clientage, deference, and religious belief that underpinned philanthropy was widely disdained by the mid-twentieth century in communist and social democratic states alike, sometimes even in the United States of the New Deal and Johnson’s “Great Society”.

By creating the welfare state, therefore, one might bring this broad-brush, highly schematic survey to a close by proposing that the nation-state destroyed philanthropy. Taxes trumped tithes. Or did they? At the start of the twenty-first century the nation-state seems to be in something less than rude health, even as the Gates Foundation established in 2000 grows in stature. The Gates Foundation stands out from earlier foundations estab-

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in January 2008. I am grateful to Dr Peter Mandler and Professor David Cesarani OBE for the invitation to speak. I would like to thank the President of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Emílio Rui Vilar, for granting me access to his institution’s archives, as well as to Dr Castelo Branco, Dr Rui Esgaio and Mafalda de Aguiar for making my visits to the Foundation so pleasant. The views expressed in this essay are, however, mine alone. Gulbenkian’s great-grandson, Martin Essayan, The Rev. Schnork Bagdassarian, and Hazel Cook of Kensington Central Library also provided invaluable assistance.
lished by other Americans not only for the size of its endowment but for its international (one might even say meta- or supra-national) perspective and for the introduction of efficiency monitoring and dynamism never before seen in the “not-for-profit” sector. From the Fugger banking family of fifteenth-century Augsburg to the Mellons and Rockefellers of Gilded Age New York philanthropy has often been perceived as posthumous atonement for sins committed in the pursuit of profit. When Bill Gates retired from day-to-day running of the Microsoft Corporation he had founded, that firm’s reputation was certainly in need of embellishment.

Yet Gates clearly felt that his foundation should embrace and develop rather than expiate or atone for the heavy-handed methods the company adopted with rival firms, regulatory institutions, state governments, and multi-national entities like the EU. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation does not have a “home” nation or identity. Whether it be the United States or Uganda, the Foundation views nation-states with a level-headedness that can appear arrogant to those who perceive nation-states as permanent, supreme, and eternal “givens” on the world stage. As far as the Gates Foundation is concerned each and every government is a prospective partner whose health budgets can be used to leverage the Foundation’s own funds — or if necessary circumvented entirely.

Seen in this light the Gates Foundation is not “American philanthropy”. It is not even about Gates. In June 2006 Warren Buffett announced his intention to donate his charitable fund to the Gates Foundation. As far as the famous “Sage of Omaha” was concerned this was no self-effacing gesture, but simply a decision to invest his philanthropy where it would earn the greatest “return” to humanity. With the continued rise of “ethical” funds, NGOs, and CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) the triumph of the nation-state over philanthropy looks far from total. These are among the less familiar manifestations of that same globalization so often trumpeted or derided (according to taste) as shaping our collective present and future.

The Gates Foundation seems to be so much a product of economic forces unleashed in the last two decades that it is hard to imagine anyone developing a similar vision of philanthropy without borders before our own times. This essay nonetheless contends that someone did in fact develop it half a century earlier: the Armenian oil magnate Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian (1869-1955). In life Gulbenkian had embodied global capitalism. Willing to strike deals with pliant host governments from time to time, his vision remained rootless — ruthless, many said. Were he alive today the anti-globalization movement would struggle to find a more perfect bogeyman than Gulbenkian. Yet he left the majority of his vast fortune to a charitable foundation intended to perpetuate this international perspective, spending money in the same enterprising spirit and with equal disdain for national borders. As his closest friend, Lord Cyril Radcliffe later observed, “In all the years during
which he confided in me his ideas as to the eventual creation of a great public
Trust I never heard him express an intention to favour specially any particu-
lar country. He spoke always of ‘humanity’ as his beneficiary”1.

Sadly it was not to be. In order to discover how this happened we first
need to assess how far the vision for Gulbenkian’s foundation reflected his
Armenian roots, and how far it was intended to enshrine lessons learned in
a long and controversial career at the pinnacle of the oil industry. This essay
is divided into four sections. It begins with a consideration of Gulbenkian’s
Armenian identity and his Armenian charitable endeavours, many of which
were intended to commemorate other members of his family. This model of
philanthropy was gradually eclipsed, however, as Gulbenkian formulated his
internationalist vision in the years after 1937, the focus of the following
section. The essay then turns to consider how this vision collapsed in the
years immediately after his death in 1955. As we shall see, the Portuguese
dictator Salazar achieved in death what nobody had achieved in life: he
outfoxed Gulbenkian.

Gulbenkian took great pride in being an international negotiator who
conjured elegant yet flexible business structures out of the most unpromising
of materials, convincing the world’s largest oil companies to set aside their
status as “national champions” and collaborate for their mutual enrichment.
The Foundation should have been the masterpiece, the final testament of a
supreme business architect. The story told here using previously unexamined
documents from the Foundation’s own archive sheds light on the personality
and priorities of one of the twentieth-century’s more elusive characters; a
chapter in a biography that has yet to be written2. It raises important ques-
tions about the relationship between individual enterprise and philanthropy on
the one hand and state regulation and welfare on the other.

ARMENIAN PHILANTHROPY

Born in an empire (Ottoman) that collapsed to a family whose Armenian
homeland had disappeared in 1375, raised in Cairo and London, a member

1 Radcliffe to Perdigão, 27 February 1956, cited in Nubar Gulbenkian (1965, p. 331). The
original is in the archives of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Lisbon (hereinafter cited
as CGF), Box 2, RAD 262.

2 There is a published biography by Ralph Hewins (2009) recently translated into
Portuguese. Hewins’ biography is a poor, gossipy work of journalism that Nubar Gulbenkian,
Radcliffe and the FCG found distasteful. Nubar informed the Foundation that he and Radcliffe
had contacted Hewins’ publisher after reading advance copies. The author was prepared in
his words to “blow” (i.e., suppress or abandon) publication, but only if the costs he had
incurred while writing it were reimbursed to him. See Nubar Gulbenkian to FCG, [3] September
1957. CGF, KLE67.
of the Persian diplomatic legation to Paris who retired to Portugal while remaining a British citizen, nobody quite knew where Gulbenkian was coming from, or whose side he was on. However complicated his life story, a “rags to riches” story it was not. Calouste Sarkis was born in 1869 into a wealthy family of Scutari, outside the then capital of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople. His grandfather and father Sarkis were powerful dynasts, fiercely proud of their descent from the 5th-century princely house of Reshtouni and closely allied to other wealthy Armenian bankers and industrialists scattered around the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Caucasus. In return for imperial protection they offered loans and counsel, which in young Calouste’s case would take the form of drawing the Sublime Porte’s attention to the vast potential of oil deposits located in Mesopotamia, present-day Iraq.

There were limits to the declining Ottoman Empire’s ability to keep its side of the bargain, and in 1898 Calouste and his family were forced to flee Constantinople during one of the earlier Armenian massacres. Their escape onto a boat owned by Calouste’s in-laws, the Essayans, had to be effected in such haste that there was no time to wait for the family’s clothes to return from the laundry. Long after the event Nevarte Gulbenkian’s plaintive appeal “But the laundry hasn’t come back yet!” was still being rehearsed on any occasion that somebody failed to see the big picture. The fact that the Gulbenkians could see the humorous side of a potentially fatal calamity speaks volumes for their indomitable and itinerant spirit, an amalgam of fierceness and flexibility instilled by centuries of persecution. Although he and his wife kept a townhouse near Hyde Park between 1900 and 1925 and would later own a palatial residence in Paris, Calouste Gulbenkian preferred to live in hotels. This inability to settle may explain some of his unwillingness to establish his foundation in a timely fashion.

Calouste studied engineering at King’s College, London, and took British citizenship in 1902. He served his apprenticeship underAlexander Mantachev, a ruthless operator who had made his fortune in the cutthroat world of the Baku oilfields. What with his wife Nevarte’s links to the family of Egyptian prime minister Nubar Pasha, Gulbenkian had a ready-made network that he took no time in exploiting. He was soon representing Mantachev and other Russian oil interests in London, and successfully negotiating alliances. First he brokered the marriage of Shell and Royal Dutch, then he brought in Mantachev and the Russians. In the early part of his career Gulbenkian was closest to the British/Dutch combine Royal Dutch Shell (RDS), bringing them a series of new concessions in Venezuela and Mexico and helping them face off transatlantic competitors such as Standard Oil and Socony. Later in his life he moved closer to the French Compagnie Française des Pétroles, but he was careful never to throw his lot in with just one player.
His greatest deal was the 1928 Red Line Agreement he negotiated between the British, Americans, and French, under which all agreed to collaborate to exploit oil deposits within the bounds of the former Ottoman Empire. This cartel, vested as the Iraq Petroleum Company (or IPC, formerly the Turkish Petroleum Company) protected all parties from price-cutting or sudden changes in "liftings" (the amount of oil extracted), and secured Gulbenkian’s own firm, Participations and Explorations Inc. (Partex) a 5% stake of total production. “Mr Five Percent” was born, and carefully watched over his Agreement, tweaking it as circumstances demanded.

Throughout repeated series of negotiations Gulbenkian always had to watch his back. When the Second World War broke out Gulbenkian was living in Paris, and he chose to remain there after France fell. Back in 1920 he had been appointed Commercial Advisor to the Empire of Persia, and the resulting diplomatic status made Vichy France an appealing enough place to stay. His residency left him exposed to the hostile machinations of his IPC partners, however. When the British Trading With the Enemy Department dubbed Gulbenkian an “Enemy Alien” and froze his assets, the aforementioned partners used this as an excuse to stop paying him the proceeds from sales of his 5%. In 1942 Persia entered the war on the Allied side, forcing him to move to neutral Portugal, but the American and British authorities continued to harass him with tight wartime restrictions on currency movements. On December 17th 1942 he was arrested and imprisoned in Lisbon in circumstances that remain mysterious, but which did nothing to dampen Gulbenkian’s suspicions of his British partners.

A replacement for the Red Line Agreement was successfully thrashed out in 1948, but Gulbenkian had to keep fighting his corner right up until his death in Lisbon on the 20th of July 1955. Estrangement from his only son, Nubar Sarkis Gulbenkian, also cast a shadow over these years. Although his long and colourful retirement in London makes it easy to dismiss him as a spoiled playboy, in the 1920s Nubar had been his father’s right-hand man. Unfortunately Nubar’s own career faltered in 1925 when he lost his job as assistant to RDS Chairman Henri Deterding over a minor squabble between his boss and his father Calouste. Nubar’s later attempts to strike an independent path were fitful, consisting of a series of brief marriages with non-Armenians contracted without his father’s consent, and a particularly painful dispute over where the remains of Nevarte Gulbenkian (who died in 1952) were to be buried. A series of legal battles spluttered on between father and son, starting in 1939 in a struggle over proceeds from a Canadian holding company and continuing after Gulbenkian’s death, with the Foundation inheriting the

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3 See Sir Stanley Wyatt (British Embassy, Lisbon) to K. M. Crump (Ministry of Economic Warfare), 8 April 1944, National Archives, London, FO371/40215, E1106.
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Founder’s brief and continuing the fight on into the 1960s. Seen in hindsight, this dispute was a massive distraction at a time when Gulbenkian could have been focussing on developing plans for his Foundation.

Calouste Gulbenkian’s fortune may have had its origins in his family’s considerable wealth and standing within the elite of the Armenian diaspora, but its impressive size was ultimately a testament to his ability as a negotiator, itself founded on a mastery of technical detail that surprised all but those privileged enough to see the hard work that went on behind the scenes. And those were very few in number. Gulbenkian’s manner was highly formal. As one close friend noted “he wrote and spoke a little in the style of one Eastern potentate negotiating a treaty with another. He did not like company or society, nor was he at all convivial” (Radcliffe, 1968, pp. 61-65). Those few who were taken into confidence were never in any doubt as to what had happened to them, or that they had been taken into confidence, that their role in the transition was passive. Their common ground was circumscribed by its own red lines. A young Kenneth Clark was one of those surprised to find himself on the inside in the 1930s, advising Gulbenkian on his art purchases and receiving letters in which the collector spoke humbly of his maturing taste for such treasures. Before and during the Second World War the Director of the National Gallery helped Gulbenkian develop plans for a Gulbenkian Gallery, a two-storey annexe to the aforementioned Gallery designed by the American architect Walter Delano. Though plans and a maquette were made, a series of slights by Clark’s post-war successor at the National Gallery led Gulbenkian to change his plans. This episode is a story in itself, one I have discussed fully elsewhere. Gulbenkian’s relationship to Clark is nonetheless typical, involving as it did a certain lowering of the defences in one area of activity, while retaining his characteristic reserve and silence regarding other compartments of his life.

Do Gulbenkian’s Armenian philanthropies represent one such compartment, or are they of overarching importance? Gulbenkian’s efforts here began in January 1916, when he gave £15 to the Lord Mayor’s Fund for Armenian Refugees. The flood of Armenian refugees fleeing Turkish-sponsored genocide led to the creation of a constellation of funds, commissions and delegations in London, Paris, Marseilles, Jerusalem, and the United States. Gulbenkian’s papers document regular gifts from the 1920s right up to 1948, when he provided the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) with funds to feed Armenian refugees caught up in violence that followed

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4 See Gulbenkian to Clark, 24 April 1939, Tate Archive, London, 8812.1.4.165a.
6 CGF, LDN98.
British forces’ evacuation from Jerusalem. In the run-up to the 1920 San Remo Conference on Armenia he joined other leading Armenians in lobbying British officials, to little effect, as neither Britain nor France nor America were interested in taking up the Armenian mandate. Within two years Armenia was torn in two, with Turkey seizing the western half in another orgy of violence, and the Bolsheviks infiltrating the east from Azerbaijan, ultimately creating a puppet state of Eastern Armenia that was entirely absorbed by the Russians when the USSR was formally established on December 30th, 1922.

These are doubtless only a few of the Armenian causes Gulbenkian supported, and the author’s inability to read Armenian means that any conclusions must be tentative. One can say that Gulbenkian’s grants were relatively modest, and suggest that this may have reflected impatience with the sheer number of competing Armenian charities, with their lack of coordination and tendency to divert funds intended to provide practical assistance for the purposes of lobbying and printing propaganda. In 1921 Gulbenkian pointedly refused an appeal from the Patriarch Presidents of the Conseil Mixte Arménien to chair a new Central Commission designed to collect money for “political purposes and propaganda”. He had already tried, he explained, to get the various Armenian delegations in exile to cooperate and exert tighter control over their charitable grants, only to be snubbed.

Gulbenkian’s last attempt to intervene in diaspora politics came in 1930-1932, when he served as President of the Armenian General Benevolent Union, or AGBU. It had taken a good deal of lobbying to induce him to take on the post, but once in office Gulbenkian threw his financial and organizing talents into renewed efforts to centralize the administration of Armenian charities. His hope was that by pooling their resources a holding company of sufficient size could be created, and issue shares for purchase by patriotic Armenians, thus leveraging its funds further. This money could then be used to secure matching funds under a scheme developed by the League of Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, helping relocate thousands of Armenian refugees to new purpose-built communities in Syria and Lebanon.

7 Examples of these donations include 100,000 francs given in 1920 to the Délégation de l’Arménie Intégrale, 5,000 francs for Armenian refugees that had fled Kemalist Turkey’s pillaging of Smyrna (1922), and a further 50,000 to Near East Relief of Istanbul, to buy wheat for Armenians in the Caucasus, CGF, LDN159, LDN449, LDN159. For Jerusalem, see Astrig Tchamkerten (2006, pp. 93-97).

8 Unidentified correspondent to Gulbenkian, 26 January 1920, CGF, LDN159.

9 Gulbenkian to Their Beatitudes the Patriarch Presidents of the Conseil Mixte Arménien, n. d. [1921], CGF, LDN405. One can sense Gulbenkian’s detachment from the cut and thrust of debate in his marginalia to a 1921 letter from one the editors of an Armenian paper, The New East, published in London, Torcom to Gulbenkian, 7 October 1921, CGF, LDN405.
Although a few such communities were in fact built, Gulbenkian’s vision and example — he started the scheme off himself by donating £3,250 (almost a third of the £10,000 target) — did not elicit much response. Part of the problem lay in the different legal restrictions binding various testamentary funds created by other wealthy expatriates. Though plans for his own foundation still lay in the future, Gulbenkian was receiving an early lesson in how not to establish a foundation, one that clearly stayed with him. His leadership of AGBU ended with his resignation in April 1932. His support for permanent resettlement of refugees in French-mandated areas of the Middle East — where their pro-French sympathies made them especially welcome — led to him becoming the target in October 1931 of a smear campaign in the newspaper *Soviet Armenia*, which tarred him as an “imperialist agent”. Gulbenkian’s reversal of AGBU’s previous policy of “repatriating” refugees to Soviet Armenia may reflect innate distrust of the Soviet regime. But it may also have been a response to reports that Stalin was exploiting such refugees as slave labour in factories, rather than allowing them to practice their own trades in freedom.\(^{10}\)

Despite these disappointments, Gulbenkian’s Armenian philanthropies have left concrete results, notably St. Sarkis Church, an Armenian church he built in London’s South Kensington (1922-1923) and the Gulbenkian Library in the Armenian Patriarchate in Old Jerusalem (1929-1932), both created in memory of his father. It was relatively common for successful Armenians to erect and endow churches. Gulbenkian had hesitated before following suit, in the belief that the “depressed” state of the Armenian “nation” rendered such a step “premature having regard to the sad state of our general national conditions”. Dr Abel Abrahamian, leader of the Armenian community in London brought him round, and in January 1921 Gulbenkian offered to sell £15,000 worth of Dutch securities to fund a new church.\(^{11}\) He took a close interest in the design process, as his correspondence with the architects Mewès and Dawes shows.\(^{12}\) Their final design was a proud if small (less than 10m\(^2\)) jewel tucked down a side street.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) Gulbenkian to Abel Abrahamian [Nazarian], 10 January 1921, CGF, LDN450.

\(^{12}\) Mewès and Dawes’ first design was a lower, longer structure, redolent of a Norman chapel. The second, more Armenian design is reproduced in the *Survey of London*, 42, Pl. 150d. The final design was modelled on the bell-tower of the Church of St. Nshan at the monastery of St. Haghpats in Armenia, illustrated in a book on Armenian architecture that Gulbenkian had passed to the architects. For the correspondence and an image of the first design, see CGF, LDN450, *Survey of London*, 42, 389-391.

\(^{13}\) For images of the church in its original state (before extensions of 1937 and 1950), see Kensington Borough Archives, Box T, 22.53, *Architectural Review*, 53 (1923, pp. 169-174) and 62 (1927, p. 24).
Armenian churches are highly democratic, and church committees normally enjoy extensive powers over the choice of incumbent. Sensitized to this issue by his involvement in Armenian refugee charities, Gulbenkian placed the church and its attached vicarage under the aegis of a charitable trust, the St. Sarkis Trust, precisely to ensure that his Trustees would remain in control. Despite these precautions the Church Council and the Armenian Bishop Turian of London managed to make trouble over the choice of incumbent, holding a series of heated meetings in early 1923 at which the disappointed Bishop claimed to be “supported by the will of the ‘Nation’” and vowed “to tear up the despot[s, i.e., the St Sarkis Trustees] of the London church”. In February 1923 the Trustees pushed Abrahamian off the board and determined that in future they would no longer consult the congregation⁽¹⁴⁾.

The Gulbenkian Library in Jerusalem emerged from a committee formed in Jerusalem to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the ordination of the leader of the Armenian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Yeghishe Turian, a noted scholar with his own important collection of early Armenian books. The Patriarchate’s library was initially housed in the church of St. Toros, which had been converted into a library in 1897 by Patriarch Yarut’iwn Vehabedian. The Turian committee had collected £3,000 toward a new library when Gulbenkian made his offer to pay for construction. Foundations were laid in October 1929, and the simple two-storey structure opened (with a collection of 25,037 books) on October 23, 1932, the birthday of Turian, who had since died. The library quickly became a focus for donations from all across the Armenian diaspora. In 1954 Gulbenkian amended the deeds of the St. Sarkis Trust, giving it the added duty of making regular annual contributions toward the library’s upkeep. In 2000 the Library was renovated, with additional assistance from the Gulbenkian Foundation⁽¹⁵⁾.

In the absence of a viable sovereign Armenian state the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem had long provided members of the diaspora with a surrogate national infrastructure that was as much political as religious. The Armenian quarter of Old Jerusalem dated back to the 5th century. Pilgrimage to the Patriarchate of St. James secured one the title *Mahdesi*, one proudly born by Calouste’s ancestors. There is evidence of Gulbenkians funding the Patriarchate as early as 1810 (Tchamkerten, 2006, p. 11). Calouste made the pilgrimage with his parents in 1877, when he was eight years old, and would repeat the journey in 1934, when he was able to visit the library he had recently endowed (Tchamkerten, 2006, pp. 44-47). In addition to donating the London church and Patriarchate library, Gulbenkian also wished to pay for the restoration of the cathedral at Etchmiadzine, inside Soviet-controlled

⁽¹⁴⁾ Abrahamian had since taken the name Nazarian, CGF, LDN497.
Armenia. The Armenian Church’s poor relations with the Russian regime prevented him from realizing this plan during his lifetime, but he instructed the Foundation created under his 1953 will to see this project through as soon as the political situation permitted, allocating a fund of $300,000 for this purpose. It was able to do so within a few years of his death. This, together with the donation of the Salamet Han estate in Constantinople to the city’s Yedi Kule Hospital and the creation of a nurses’ home from the sale of his wife Nevarte’s jewellery closed the Armenian chapter in Gulbenkian’s philanthropies. This had been a very private chapter, one conceived in dynastic terms, as a series of monuments to Gulbenkian’s parents and his beloved wife. Though the Gulbenkian Foundation’s Armenian Communities Department has continued and expanded this work to include support of a range of Armenian refugee hostels, orphanages, schools, and hospitals, it is clear that in Gulbenkian’s own mind his Foundation was intended as something distinct, a gift to “humanity”, rather than the Armenian community.

GULBENKIAN’S INTERNATIONAL VISION

This distinction was revealed in the stark contrast between the clarity of Gulbenkian’s instructions regarding Armenian projects and the refusal of his 1953 will adequately to define the aims and terms of reference of the Foundation. It is this lack of clarity that made it possible for two of his executors and the Portuguese regime to conspire against his wishes for an international charity. Clause 10 of Gulbenkian’s will stated that

\( a \) it is a Portuguese permanent Foundation, its domicile shall be at Lisbon, but it may have any such branches as may be considered necessary at any place in the civilised world;
\( b \) its purposes shall be charitable, artistic, educational and scientific;
\( c \) Its activities shall be exercised not only in Portugal, but also in any other country where its managers may think fit.

Clauses 15 and 16 named three Trustees (this word appeared, in English and in quotation marks, in the original Portuguese text): Gulbenkian’s son-in-law Kevork Loris Essayan, a self-effacing Armenian who had helped

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17 The Foundation’s Armenian Affairs Department was the brainchild of Gulbenkian’s son-in-law, Kevork Essayan. In the early years of the foundation it enjoyed generous support under Essayan’s leadership (14% of grants in 1955-9, it fell to 9% by 1966-1968). Essayan’s switch of loyalty (discussed below) may well stem from his having secured Perdigão’s agreement to such a commitment to the Armenian community.
Jonathan Conlin

manage Gulbenkian’s business interests, his Portuguese lawyer, José Azeredo de Perdigão, and his closest friend, the Appeal Court judge Lord Cyril Radcliffe, who, like Essayan, was familiar with Gulbenkian’s commercial activities, having served as his chief legal advisor since the 1930s. Clause 15 noted that Radcliffe’s responsibilities in Britain might prevent him from taking up his duties immediately, but was nonetheless clear that he was to have “the supreme direction of the administration of the estate and of the Foundation”\(^{18}\). Radcliffe was to serve full-time and be paid £20,000 a year. The others were to receive only £4,000, presumably because the work was not expected to take up all their time.

As it turned out, a dispute broke out between September 1955 and June 1956 over the conditions imposed on the embryonic Foundation by the Portuguese state. Salazar’s regime only passed the decree-law of July 1956 granting the Gulbenkian Foundation charitable, tax exempt status once the Trustees agreed statutes ensuring that the Board would always maintain a majority of individuals holding Portuguese nationality. Radcliffe saw that demand as a betrayal of the founder’s wishes, and renounced his Trusteeship on June 1, 1956. Perdigão now took the leading role. While he initially endeavoured to mask the extent of this Portuguese “capture” of the Foundation, the percentage of grants distributed inside Portugal started high (42%) and has since increased to over 85%\(^{19}\). The rest of this essay will consider the evidence for Gulbenkian’s international vision, and then show how that vision was betrayed by Perdigão in a series of chicanes — chicanes that, depending on where you stand, either smack of collaboration with a grasping and introverted dictatorship or of a patriotic if somewhat passive compromise that protected the Foundation from total oblivion. Without Gulbenkian’s own testimony we are obliged to choose between Radcliffe and Perdigão, both of whom claimed to have privileged knowledge of Gulbenkian’s intentions. We also need to answer to another question: what did Portugal mean to “Mr Five Percent”?

Gulbenkian’s idea for a Foundation emerged from his discussions with Kenneth Clark about the proposed “Gulbenkian Institute” at the National Gallery. These began in 1937, at which point Clark was already reassuring Gulbenkian that he could retain his British domicile by drafting a will under English law — which he eventually did\(^{20}\). Right from the start Gulbenkian was obsessed by the desire to avoid death duties, and his delay in pinning down his intentions was partly a case of a consummate negotiator coyly

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\(^{19}\) This even as Perdigão’s reports insisted that it spent “approximatively 50% of its funds outside Portugal”. CGF, *Chairman’s Report IV* (Lisbon, CGF, 1970, p. 197).

\(^{20}\) Clark to Gulbenkian, 11 August 1937, Tate Archive, 8812.1.4.165a.
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teasing would-be beneficiaries. Gulbenkian’s grandfather had lived until 106, and he thought he had time on his hands. Although Clark could and did draw on the advice and influence of National Gallery Trustees such as John Maynard Keynes, by 1943 Gulbenkian decided to entrust Cyril Radcliffe rather than Clark with the realization of his plans21. Radcliffe’s relationship with Gulbenkian went back to the early 1930s, when Radcliffe was working in the chambers of Gulbenkian’s lawyer, Wilfrid Greene. When Greene became Lord Justice of Appeal in 1935 Radcliffe became Gulbenkian’s lead counsel. Within a few years Gulbenkian had recognized in the equally retiring Radcliffe a friend he could trust, one who shared his interest in collecting paintings. In October 1951 he offered Radcliffe the position of lead trustee of his planned Foundation22.

Radcliffe had followed Greene to the House of Lords in 1949, an unusually rapid promotion, as Lords of Appeal were rarely appointed direct from the Bar. In addition to his official duties Radcliffe also led several public enquiries, such as the Royal Commission on Taxation (1951-1955). Within a few weeks of renouncing the Trusteeship in 1956 he was undertaking a dangerous mission to Cyprus, as Constitutional Commissioner charged with attempting to lay the foundations for lasting peace on that troubled island23. By 1953 Gulbenkian was anxious to “concretize” his plans and was frustrated by Radcliffe’s zeal in the service of the British state24. Radcliffe proposed alternative lead trustees with more time to devote to the Foundation. The plan fell through, however, and Gulbenkian stubbornly stuck to his guns, confident that Radcliffe would come through for him eventually25.

Radcliffe took time out from his other commitments to make regular visits to Lisbon, often accompanied by his wife Antonia and the children from her first marriage. Between August 1949 and Gulbenkian’s death in

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21 Gulbenkian to Clark, 7 September 1943, Tate Archive, 8812.1.4.165b. The earliest letter between Radcliffe and Gulbenkian to refer to the intended foundation is dated 16 October 1939, CGF, Box CSG 3, RAD2.
22 Radcliffe to Gulbenkian, 26 October 1951, CGF, Box CSG 3, RAD228.
23 For Radcliffe’s career, see Edmund Heward (1994).
24 “I am quite prepared to concretize the foundation without further delay, and to support same with very substantial funds, so that it should start working during my lifetime, and that I should myself become one of its Trustees, if at all possible; that would afford me the opportunity of following personally its running, and to amend same should it be deemed advisable” (Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 11 June 1953, CGF, Box CSG 4, RAD475).
25 These alternatives were Sir Frederick Grant QC and former Treasury Solicitor Sir Thomas Barnes. Grant decided to accept the Chairmanship of the Iron and Steel Foundation, Barnes joined the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission in 1954, and served until 1959. For Radcliffe and Gulbenkian’s discussion of the two as possible Trustees, see CGF, Box CSG 4, RAD475, RAD480, RAD495, RAD502. Radcliffe discusses these approaches in Radcliffe to Perdigão, 16 April 1956, Gulbenkian (1965, p. 355), original CGF, Box 2, RAD372.
July 1955 Radcliffe visited Gulbenkian ten times: twice in Paris, eight times in Lisbon\textsuperscript{26}. On each occasion the pair were closeted for long periods. After one of his 1953 visits Radcliffe wrote of his concern that his ten-day visit to Lisbon may have left Gulbenkian worn out by “all our talks”\textsuperscript{27}. Gulbenkian feared that his rivals and their allied governments were reading his mail. He wished to keep even his closest family ignorant of his intentions. He would not, therefore, commit details of his Foundation to paper until he absolutely had to. Our only clues as to what Gulbenkian and Radcliffe discussed in their “talks” are their letters to each other, which do not reveal much, for the same reasons. We do know that Radcliffe and Gulbenkian discussed the models afforded by the Wellcome Trust and Rockefeller Foundation\textsuperscript{28}.

From the start Gulbenkian was wary of associating his Foundation with any government. As a letter of May 1953 shows, Radcliffe shared his concern that, given the chance, any one government might endeavour to “capture” the Foundation, but argued, perhaps paradoxically, that the best defense was to associate it with two: Portugal and England.

What I feel strongly is that your Foundation needs buttressing by all means possible if it is to realise the aims you wish for it….I think it will be at its weakest if you envisage it as the administrative concern of a few private individuals, mainly lawyers, who will conduct it according to their private judgment. It will be too large, too wealthy, and the interests that will belong to it are too important, economically and politically, to allow of that. Its funds will be so considerable that its “patronage” will be of international importance. I have seen too much of Governments to trust any of them to leave such sources untapped, unless it clearly suits them to do so, or it would be too obviously embarrassing to do otherwise.

Once Gulbenkian died, he argued, various individuals and governments would endeavour to rush into the resulting vacuum.

And, carefully as Dr. Perdigão has considered the question of validity… I do not gather from him that anyone can say with certainty that the law is on your side. It is all this sort of thing — and I could enlarge upon it for a

\textsuperscript{26} These visits were in August 1949, Christmas 1951, July and September 1952 [both in Paris], April, September and Christmas 1953, and April, September, and Christmas 1954.
\textsuperscript{27} Radcliffe to Gulbenkian, 15 April 1953, CGF, RAD444.
\textsuperscript{28} See Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 30 August 1953 (Wellcome), CGF, Box CSG 4, RAD509. Radcliffe, \textit{Not in feather beds}, p. 126 (Rockefeller). It is interesting that despite Gulbenkian having known Lord Leverhulme personally, the Leverhulme Foundation is not mentioned. Radcliffe ordered that his own correspondence be destroyed on his death.
long time — that makes me urge that your Foundation should be as public as possible, as little private as possible\textsuperscript{29}.

Gulbenkian did not take up Radcliffe’s suggestion of having two ex-officio Trusteeships for one British and one Portuguese diplomat, appointments which would, Radcliffe believed, make it too embarrassing for either state to attempt a power grab. The only important alteration to the board that was made was the decision to add Nubar Gulbenkian, a decision that Gulbenkian reached on his own\textsuperscript{30}. Unfortunately Calouste Gulbenkian did not live long enough to make this addition official. At Gulbenkian’s death, therefore, there were three trustees: Radcliffe, Perdigão and Essayan\textsuperscript{31}.

Of these three, Perdigão was the outsider. The only Portuguese and the only one of the three with no knowledge of Gulbenkian’s commercial activities, Perdigão’s relationship with Gulbenkian went back to 1942, when Gulbenkian took up residence in the Aviz Hotel in Lisbon. Perdigão was the city’s leading lawyer, and represented other foreign residents seeking a comfortable bolt-hole in which to wait out the war, among them Henri de Rothschild\textsuperscript{32}. Perdigão kept out of the way when Radcliffe and Gulbenkian met. In his letters Gulbenkian repeatedly explains who Perdigão is, though he does at one point describe him as “my Portuguese lawyer and friend”\textsuperscript{33}. In 1945, 1949 and 1951 Gulbenkian appointed Perdigão Director of first one, then two, and finally an additional nine Gulbenkian shell companies. Perdigão’s role here was very much that of the straw man. That Gulbenkian had to explain to him that IPC was a major oil company in the Middle East speaks volumes\textsuperscript{34}. A survey of Gulbenkian’s correspondence over the five years preceding his death indicates that among Gulbenkian’s lawyers Perdigao’s role was minor relative to that played by Charles Whishaw, L. G. Denton, and Avetoom Pesak Hacobian. Perdigão was not a trusted business aide.

\textsuperscript{29} Radcliffe to Gulbenkian, 25 May 1953, CGF, Box CSG 4, RAD466.
\textsuperscript{30} Gulbenkian mooted the idea of adding Nubar in Paris in July 1952, but was dissuaded by Radcliffe’s opposition and by a deterioration in his own relations with his son. In the spring of 1954, however, a weakened Gulbenkian seems to have patched things up. Radcliffe now had no objections; his opinion may not have been solicited. See RAD339, RAD365, RAD367 and RAD585.
\textsuperscript{31} After Calouste Gulbenkian’s death Perdigão offered to make Nubar a Trustee, but the latter refused to do so except under the Chairmanship of Radcliffe. On Perdigão repeating the offer (this time in the name of himself and Essayan) in April 1956, Nubar seemed willing (Radcliffe had encouraged him to become a Trustee and do what he could to ensure his father’s wishes were respected), but delayed sufficiently for the deadline by which Perdigão had insisted a decision had to be made passed, and the offer was not repeated. Gulbenkian (1965, pp. 263 and 268-269).
\textsuperscript{32} For Rothschild’s dossier, see CGF, Box CSG 15.
\textsuperscript{33} Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 27 August 1952, CGF, RAD372.
\textsuperscript{34} Gulbenkian to Perdigão, 26 September 1945, CGF, JAP235.
Even as he acknowledged “the collaboration of Doctor Perdigão”, Gulbenkian still felt himself to be “single-handed” in Lisbon when it came to planning his foundation. Perdigão’s guidance was limited to questions of local law. Even there, he was not much help. As Radcliffe noted in the letter quoted above, Perdigão prevaricated on several key issues. Perdigão initially reassured Gulbenkian that a British subject was entirely free to dispose of his estate under Portuguese testamentary law. By January 1952 he had changed his mind. He later changed his opinion as to whether the principle of “renvoi” applied under Portuguese law or not — and then denied to Gulbenkian’s face having done so. Gulbenkian had spent his life among lawyers, retaining them in several different countries. He was not impressed. “Doctor Perdigão is considered to be the best jurist in Portugal, and he stands very high here, but there it is”, he shrugs in one letter. Gulbenkian’s response here may be one of bemusement, but such revisions were already narrowing his room for maneuvre. Though the role allotted Perdigão in first planning and later implementing the Foundation was a small one compared to Radcliffe’s, this did not discourage “my Portuguese lawyer” from overstating the degree of trust Gulbenkian placed in him in life, from claiming to know Gulbenkian’s mind better than Radcliffe did, or from posing as defender of “the Founder’s wishes” after his death, even as he took the Foundation in a different direction.

Perdigão claimed that Gulbenkian’s choice of Portugal as the headquarters of his foundation reflected a deep sense of gratitude toward the country and shared values. The Portugal Gulbenkian discovered in 1942 had begun the century as a monarchy but become a Republic in 1910. A series of short-lived ministries had been ended by General Gomes da Costa’s coup in 1926. The democratic constitution was repealed in 1933, by which time the former Coimbra economics professor Dr. Oliveira de Salazar was firmly in control. Prime Minister Salazar brought financial stability, and established a highly-conservative and introverted “New State” (“Estado Novo”) founded on Catholic family values. There was no right to free assembly or free expression and all aspects of life were under the tight supervision of the PVDE (Polícia de Vigilância e de Defesa do Estado), the state security service, which was renamed the PIDE (Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado) in 1945. Salazar never travelled further afield than Spain, and reviled

35 Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 5 August 1953, CGF, Box CSG4, RAD500.
36 Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 15 January 1950, CGF, RAD250.
37 Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 26 January 1952, CGF, RAD263.
38 He told Radcliffe that he (Perdigão) was the “most qualified person to interpret the thought which dictated the working up of Mr Gulbenkian’s will”. Perdigão to Radcliffe, 22 March 1956, Gulbenkian (1965, p. 351), original CGF, Box 2, RAD318.
all forms of internationalism, even the Boy Scout movement. Portugal’s colonies in Africa were considered as integral parts of Portuguese territory, and as such the rebel movements that emerged within Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau from 1961 onward met with the full resistance of the home country’s armed forces, which enjoyed generous funding under Salazar. Though Salazar’s successor Marcello Caetano was slightly more liberal, the dictatorship endured until the revolution of 25 April 1974.

There is little to suggest that this Portugal held much appeal for Gulbenkian. The decision to move there in 1942 had been made only after Nubar had convinced his father that Portugal’s location on the Atlantic made it preferable to Switzerland. Escape to the United States could be effected much more easily from Portugal. Gulbenkian saw little of the country apart from the inside of his five suites at the Aviz Hotel, and he never sold his palace on the Avenue d’Iéna in Paris, the closest thing he had to a permanent home. He did give to local charities, partly at Perdigão’s suggestion. Though he would spend a total of 13 years in Portugal and clearly had a gift for languages, Gulbenkian never learned Portuguese. This is another fact that argues against Perdigão’s claim to be a close confidante, as Perdigão’s French was not fluent, yet that was the only language he and Gulbenkian had in common. Although Gulbenkian’s financial interests were spread across the globe, none of his many shell companies was based in Portugal. The Foundation he created followed his lead, and only invested in Portuguese companies in the early 1970s, just in time to see them nationalized in the wake of the 1974 Revolution.

Gulbenkian may not have realized just how straightened Portugal was, and therefore how great a temptation his Foundation would be to the regime charged with protecting it. His one personal experience of the regime was not likely to instill confidence. On the night of December 17 1942 he was arrested at the Aviz Hotel in Lisbon and briefly incarcerated before the Egyptian ambassador could arrive on the scene and secure his release. His own account of the experience records him demanding to know on what charge he, a diplomat, had been arrested. He was unaware that under Salazar’s regime imprisonment without charge was entirely legal. For some reason he seems to have held his IPC partners responsible for this indignity, and so drew the wrong lesson from the whole embarrassing episode. As Radcliffe would later put it, for Gulbenkian Portugal was primarily a useful

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39 Perdigão to Gulbenkian, 14 December 1951, CGF, Box CSG 6, JAP125.
40 See the “Memorandum concernant l’incarcération à la Prison central de Lisboa de Monsieur Gulbenkian, conseiller economique de la legation impériale de l’Iran en France”, CGF, Box CSG2, CSG305.
place to sulk, in expectation of a prodigal return to England or France, “the two countries which in all the world had done most to form him and to give him his opportunities”:

Portugal, a pleasant and kindly refuge, could never take their place. But death duties and income taxes and exchange controls, which seemed to be all that post-war England and France had to offer to their former lover, were to him nothing but the moth and rust that were to corrupt his finely wrought treasure. He did not want to understand the reasons that made them necessary. He wanted instead to sulk and be unreasonable and, secretly, to hope that by some sweeping personal concession these erring countries would absolve him from all the burdens and restore to him all the graces of their connection. This is not what happened.

In short, Portugal’s appeal lay in its taxation regime, which was less strict than that of Britain or France. At least, it seemed less strict, according to Perdigão.

A VISION BETRAYED

When Gulbenkian died in July 1955, therefore, very little had been settled other than the Trustees, the Armenian charities, and the fact that the “Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation” would have its headquarters in Lisbon and be established under Portuguese law. The three Trustees met for the first time in their new capacity in September 1955. Radcliffe proposed to carry out the strategy outlined above by increasing the Board to include various British and Portuguese worthies in such a way as to ensure that no one country would ever secure a majority. Perdigão rejected that suggestion, arguing that any increase would lead the Portuguese government to demand a Portuguese majority on the Board as a quid pro quo for recognizing the Foundation as a charitable, tax-exempt entity. Radcliffe replied that he would never agree to serve under such a condition. He was eager to secure advice from the Rockefeller Foundation. In October 1955 Radcliffe, Essayan, and Nubar met David Rockefeller in London. Further meetings were held in London the following month with the Rockefeller Foundation’s Arthur Dean and Dean Rusk, who would later serve as Secretary of State under President Kennedy. Perdigão was a sulky presence at the meeting.

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41 Radcliffe (1968, p. 64).
42 “Draft memorandum of discussions on 20, 21, 22 Sep. 1955”, CGF, Box 1, RAD77.
43 For these meetings see CGF, Box 1, RAD94, RAD104. In an undated memo Radcliffe wrote that the Rockefeller advisers recommended that “several more or less formal repre-
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with Rusk. He did not see the point of consulting the Americans, as they knew nothing of Portuguese law. He would draft the “by-laws” himself.44 Radcliffe was now trying to pin Perdigão down about the conditions any new foundation would have to comply with in order to secure charitable status in Portugal. Radcliffe clearly realized that some negotiation with the Portuguese government would be necessary, as the proposed foundation was of international scope, and hence sui generis.45

Unfortunately for him and arguably for the Foundation itself, Salazar had his eyes on the Gulbenkian fortune. The sick man of Europe needed all the money he could get. “The Gulbenkian Foundation has unexpectedly created a public resource that could radically modify the conditions under which we seek to resolve certain fundamental problems facing Portugal”, he wrote.46 He resolved to interpret it as a “gift” to the Portuguese nation. Although relations between Perdigão and Salazar were “ceremonial” rather than cordial at the time, the former was only too willing to act on the dictator’s behalf: his first letter to Salazar dates from September 1955, and by November Salazar was writing of the “great concern” he took in the whole question.47 Gulbenkian’s will was, he wrote,

A testament of homage and trust, and it is far from unreasonable to conclude that the greatest part of the assets should go to benefit Portugal...[only after comparing them] with the total state budget for National Education, for Health and Public Assistance can one fully grasp the extent of the Foundation’s means, and what can be done for Portugal using the Foundation’s annual income... any display of weakness or lack of will on our part and we risk the enormous sums within our grasp. Measured by the scale of our country and the many problems that confront us, these sums are of substantial weight.48

44 Mysteriously, Perdigão goes on in the same letter to explain his haste in framing the ‘by-laws’ and presenting them to the Portuguese government as “due to a psychological reason” as well as “real and material interest”. Perdigão to Radcliffe, 20 October 1955, CGF, Box 1, RAD102.

45 Radcliffe to Perdigão, 29 October 1955, CGF, Box 1, RAD118.

46 “A Fundação Gulbenkian criou inesperadamente meios de aplicação pública que podem modificar por inteiro as condições em que se põem e resolvem em Portugal alguns problemas fundamentais” (cited in Maxwell, 2006, vol. 2, p. 213).


48 “O testamento e um preito de reconhecimento e de confiança, e não estaremos fora da verdade julgando que a maior parte dos valores devem ser para beneficiar Portugal... [e
After Radcliffe and Perdigão met in early January 1956, it became clear that the Portuguese majority was the main sticking point, although the question of what percentage of grants should go to Portugal was also controversial. Radcliffe wanted the Board to restrict Portuguese nationals to one third of the board, with a minimum of 15% of grants going to the “home” nation. In February Perdigão wrote relaying the Portuguese government’s demands, which he supported: the Portuguese majority and at least 33% of grants. The Portuguese were willing to phase in the majority, to allow a majority of “foreigners” for the duration of Radcliffe’s term. But otherwise Perdigão insisted that as a Portuguese entity the Gulbenkian Foundation had to have a Portuguese majority, and that it was unreasonable to expect the government to grant tax relief on the Foundation’s income without said relief being “matched” by a commitment to spend significant sums inside the host nation. Unbeknownst to Radcliffe, Perdigão had been passing all their correspondence to Salazar and fellow minister Marcello Caetano (who would eventually succeed him as Prime Minister). At least two of Perdigão’s letters to Radcliffe were drafted by Caetano and amended by Salazar, before being sent to Perdigão for signature. Perdigão was not negotiating with the government on the Foundation’s behalf, he had become the former’s mouthpiece.

“If the Foundation were set up on this basis”, Radcliffe wrote in late February, “it would not be realising the founder’s intentions: it would be flouting them. It would not be carrying out the terms of his Will: it would be defeating them”. When Perdigão sounded out Essayan he found that his fellow trustee agreed with Radcliffe’s position, with the general conclusion that Gulbenkian had wanted to create an “international” foundation. Perdigão was outnumbered. Worse still, a legal opinion was sought from two Coimbra law professors as to the Foundation’s charitable status. It said nothing about

 apologized com o orçamento total da Educação Nacional, da Saúde e da Assistência, faz-se uma ideia da grandeza de meios da Fundação e do que pode fazer-se a favor de Portugal com os rendimentos anualmente recebidos…. nós temos na mão e podemos perder por fraqueza de vontade ou imperícia somas enormes que têm um peso substancial na balança do País e na resolução de alguns dos nossos problemas” (cited in Ferreira, 2006, vol. 1, p. 87).

49 Radcliffe thought 15% might actually be too high to escape public censure, and suggested it could be just 10%. Radcliffe to Perdigão, 16 January 1956, Gulbenkian (1965, pp. 325-326), original CGF, Box 1, RAD214.


52 Perdigão to Salazar, 4 June 1956. CGF, GOV92. Space permits only a few extracts from the Perdigão/Salazar correspondence of 1955-6 to be reproduced here. For the full correspondence, see CGF, GOV1, 12, 17, 19, 20, 22, 37, 52, 53, 59, 61, 66, 69, 74, 75, 82, 86, 88, 91, 93.

53 Radcliffe to Perdigão, 27 February 1956, Gulbenkian (1965, p. 333), original CGF, Box 2, RAD 262.
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Portuguese charities having to spend a minimum amount within Portugal. But when Radcliffe pointed that out, Perdigão claimed that a minimum allocation was “the necessary presupposition of their reasoning”. As for the majority, it was “the best warrant as to the fulfilment of the Portuguese laws and even of the Government’s benevolence”\textsuperscript{54}.

The tipping point came in March 1956, when Perdigão and Essayan elected to ignore Radcliffe and proceed with negotiations with the Parisian authorities regarding Foundation assets located within France. At Gulbenkian’s death the Foundation was left holding various properties in France, including Gulbenkian’s Deauville estate Les Enclos, the palace at 51 Avenue d’Iéna in Paris, and that portion of the art collections that had remained behind when the paintings were lent, first to London and then to Washington\textsuperscript{55}. Restrictions on the export of art as well as questions of probate made the exercise particularly delicate. What price would the French government demand in exchange for unrestricted export of Gulbenkian’s treasures? Would they insist on retaining important works such as Houdon’s *Diane* or would they insist on a cut of future Foundation grants? Here again Perdigão delegated to Salazar and his allies, in this case the Portuguese ambassador in Paris, Marcelo Mathias, who later served as Salazar’s Foreign Minister. He was also made a Trustee of the Gulbenkian Foundation. Mathias struck a fairly good deal: all the art was successfully exported to Portugal in return for Les Enclos and vague promises of future grants, including funds required to build a hostel for scholars on the aforementioned estate. The Foundation held on to Gulbenkian’s residence in the Avenue d’Iéna\textsuperscript{56}.

There was, as Radcliffe pointed out, nowhere available in Lisbon to display the spoils of this deal with the French. Right “up to the end” Gulbenkian had, he said, been discussing plans to keep his art collections in Washington permanently\textsuperscript{57}. As it was, the Foundation’s art gallery opened

\textsuperscript{54} Perdigão to Radcliffe, 22 March 1956, Gulbenkian (1965, p. 349), original CGF Box 2, RAD318. For the opinion, by Ferrer Correia and Rodrigues Queiró, see CGF, Box 7.

\textsuperscript{55} Gulbenkian’s important paintings had been lent to the National Gallery in the late 1930s, were evacuated to a Welsh slate mine along with the rest of the Gallery’s collection for the duration of the war, and were then loaned to the National Gallery of Art in Washington. In the absence of anywhere to show them in Lisbon they remained there for some time after Gulbenkian’s death.

\textsuperscript{56} Especially as Mathias had initially proposed offering the French both Les Enclos and the Paris residence. Gulbenkian (1965, p. 340). Gulbenkian had initially proposed to give the latter to the American Embassy. Radcliffe proposed giving it to the French state. Radcliffe to Gulbenkian 20 November 1952, CGF, Box CSG4, RAD408.

\textsuperscript{57} The National Gallery of Art’s Director, John Walker, had indeed paid repeated visits to Lisbon in the early 1950s, and showed Gulbenkian a film of an available site next to the Gallery on the Mall — where I. M. Pei’s annexe would eventually be built. Architectural plans such as had been prepared for the London site were not, however, drawn up. Radcliffe to
only in 1969. Until then Gulbenkian’s collections were stored in the Pombal palace at Oeiras, where they suffered serious flood damage in 1967. Radcliffe insisted that the Foundation’s statutes had to be settled before any such long-term decisions were reached. Perdigão now saw Radcliffe’s resistance as based, not on principle, but on dislike of Portugal. There is no evidence to support such a conclusion, but it was enough for him to write to Essayan explaining that “you, my dear friend, and I, we are the only competent persons, with all the responsibility to execute the last will of the late Mr. C.S. Gulbenkian”.

Family tradition has it that Kevork Essayan was “a born second in command”, and he seems to have fallen under the spell of Perdigão’s charismatic personality. In the space of less than two months his letters to Perdigão suddenly change their tone. Whereas Essayan previously downplayed his own knowledge of his father-in-law’s intentions, insisting only on Gulbenkian’s supreme faith in Radcliffe, he now took a very different tone:

I do not think one should attach much importance to London’s reactions [i.e., Radcliffe and Nubar Gulbenkian’s views]. Pulcinella’s secret is that a game of chess is afoot. We may still have to attend to the sound of the bells but we should not allow ourselves to be unduly influenced…The overall disposition of the parties concerned — Radcliffe, Nubar — must become clear one way or the other in the near future, and it is at that point that we will take the final steps…Everything [in London] is part of this chess game. It may very well be that in some not too distant day we will be obliged to dot the “i”’s and in all likelihood ignore them if their opposition becomes too manifest.

Perdigão, 22 March 1956, Gulbenkian, (1965, p. 343), original CFG, Box 2, RAD305. Perdigão claimed that Gulbenkian had told him that he wanted his art collections to end up in Portugal. There is no evidence to back up this claim. Perdigão to Radcliffe, 17 April 1956. Ibid., letter 10, p. 357, original CGF, Box 2, RAD384.

58 CGF, Chairman’s Report IV, pp. 39-40.
59 “Si, en effet [sic], Lord Radcliffe s’est prononcé dans ce sens, je crains bien devoir interprêter cette opinion comme étant une nouvelle position d’hostilité de sa part anvers [sic] le Portugal, ce qui, malheureusement, ne me surprend plus [sic].” My translation. Perdigão to Essayan, 7 March 1956, CGF, PRES107.
60 “[…] vous, mon Cher Ami, et moi, nous sommes les seules personnes ayant toute la compétence [sic] et toute la responsabilité d’exécuter le Testament de feu Mr C. S. Gulbenkian”. My translation. Perdigão to Essayan, 14 March 1956, CGF, PRES107. Perdigão had already written in similar terms to Essayan exactly one week before. See ibid.
61 “Je ne crois pas qu’il faut attacher trop d’importance aux réactions londoniennes. C’est le secret de Polichinelle qu’un jeu d’êchecs est en cours. Nous devons toujours écouter les sons de cloches mais ne pas nous laisser influencer outre mesure… Dans un avenir prochain, la conjoncture générale, Radcliffe, Nubar — doit forcément s’éclaircir dans un sens ou dans
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What with Salazar’s sneers at Radcliffe’s “persistence”, which he dubbed “more stubborn than intelligent”, the impression given is of a conspiracy to outwit Radcliffe and Nubar. This conspiracy also included Mathias as well as the Portuguese ambassador in London, Pedro Theotónio Pereira. Like Mathias, Pereira was a close ally of the dictator, and would later hold cabinet office as Minister of the Presidency. He, too, became a Trustee of the Foundation.

Radcliffe was no fool, and his decision to walk away in June 1956 may well reflect awareness that he could not protect his friend’s Foundation from such characters, or from what he recognized to be an “authoritarian” regime. As early as the previous October he had observed in a letter to John Sparrow that

I have no colleagues to work with, my Portuguese colleague works against me, the Portuguese government is likely to remain unmitigatedly parochial: and I have neither the time nor the money to spend on the proper preparations until I can resign my present calling — which would leave me, in effect, helpless. So much for Mr G’s plans — or rather lack of them.

When Perdigão and his allies within the regime proposed a £1.5m grant to the National Gallery, to be paid in ten annual instalments of £150,000, Radcliffe again saw this as peremptory in view of the failure to agree basic statutes. By means of such carefully-spun proposals within Britain, however, Perdigão and Salazar had effectively rendered any appeal by Radcliffe to the
British authorities useless\textsuperscript{66}. High profile grants in 1956 as well as the high initial budget allocations given to the UK Branch of the Gulbenkian Foundation established in that year could be said to have bought off any trouble from official quarters in London. Within a few months London would have enough to occupy their attention in the form of the Suez Crisis.

And so, with Gulbenkian’s internationalist vision out of the way Salazar could establish the new Foundation by a decree law imposing a Portuguese majority. Gulbenkian’s funds, intended as a gift to “humanity”, to realize “my dreams of a vast trust embodying artistic, charitable and educational activities” were diverted to plug holes in the welfare budget of a small European hermit state, and to provide a cultural fig leaf for a regime that became even more isolated on a world stage as the 1950s ended and the 1960s began\textsuperscript{67}. There is no denying that the Gulbenkian Foundation brought real benefits to the people of Portugal, most famously through its fleet of mobile libraries (over 60 by 1960), but also through its funding of schools, orphanages, universities, travelling scholarships, music festivals, and the arts. In the early years there were sizeable grants to the Middle East, in particular to Iraq, and the UK Branch’s record in improving social welfare is also impressive. The latter’s development is the subject of a book by Robert Hewison and John Holden (2006). The Foundation’s contribution to the support of Armenian communities across the world has declined somewhat (measured as a percentage of total grants), but its commitment to the diaspora remains.

Serious questions remain over Perdigão’s chairmanship, which lasted almost half a century, until his death in 1993. Perdigão clearly enjoyed the foreign decorations, status, and patronage that came from giving. Despite the criticism of fellow Trustee Charles Whishaw, it would be difficult to wean Perdigão off the habit of issuing quite sizeable grants on his own authority as chairman\textsuperscript{68}. While the Foundation was nervous of holding exhi-

\textsuperscript{66} The National Gallery grant proposal idea was hatched in response to a speech Radcliffe had given on arts funding in the UK, which had been reported in the \textit{Sunday Telegraph} of 29 February 1956. See Perdigão to Essayan, 14 March 1956 and Radcliffe to Perdigão, 22 March 1956 [original CGF, Box 2, RAD305]. Gulbenkian, (1965, pp. 342 and 345 respectively).

\textsuperscript{67} Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 13 May 1951, CGF, Box CSG 3, RAD214.

\textsuperscript{68} Although the Trustees agreed to reduce the size and number of grants made by the Chairman acting on his own authority in September 1956, Perdigão persisted, and the number of such grants had actually risen rather than fallen by July 1958. Whishaw’s criticism of Perdigão’s haste in this and other areas upset the latter, acutely sensitive after having been the subject of similar (and equally justified) criticism from Radcliffe. Perdigão and Whishaw agreed to hold a special meeting in Lisbon specifically to enable what Whishaw called a “free and frank exchange of views”. See the Whishaw/Perdigão correspondence of April, June, July and August 1958 in CGF, KLE14, a file which does not include Whishaw’s letter of 7 August 1958, the one which hurt Perdigão most.
bitions of contemporary art after its 1957 and 1958 shows, it had no prob-
lem funding Roman Catholic missionary activities in the Portuguese colo-
nies. Indeed, Perdigão was happy to associate himself and the Foundation
Trustees with the conservative social values of the “Estado Novo”. In
1961 he brought around $16m of the Foundation’s investment’s home as a
“little service” to Salazar, whose regime was suffering from an acute short-
age of foreign currency reserves. This aborted the Foundation’s brief experi-
ment with a US branch, something that might otherwise have led to greater
distribution of grants abroad. A less self-assured Chairman might have
refrained from trying to justify these measures as honouring the Founder’s
wishes. Perdigão was very self-assured.

The Foundation’s close relations with the Salazar regime, reflected in the
makeup of its Trustees, did not protect it from censorship. In 1961 the
PIDE investigated its mobile library service, suspecting that “adverse ele-
ments” were using it as a cover. In June 1968 a visiting dance troupe
hosted by the Foundation was expelled for holding an impromptu one minute’s
silence for the victims of dictatorship (Ferreira, 2006, vol. 1, p. 119). In the

69 The exhibitions were held at the Sociedade Nacional de Belas Artes and Ateneu
Comercial do Porto respectively. Perdigão’s hesitancy is evident in the somewhat squirming
report of these shows in CGF, Chairman’s Report July 1955-31st December 1959 (Lisbon,
CGF, 1960a), p. 64. As Pereira wrote from London, “We must help and stimulate art and
artists without involving ourselves in controversies or becoming habitual producers of exhi-
bitions…. we must avoid the recurrence of aspects which do not serve the general aims of
the Foundation”. Pereira to Perdigão, 23 July 1958, CGF, KLE14. For the grant of 200,000
Esc to the missionary scheme, see Perdigão to Essayan [telegram], 24 October 1956, which
speaks of a potential “great projection of civilization” by a scheme enjoying “patronage [of]
very high entities”. As with other grants proposed by Perdigão during this time, speed and
media profile were deemed to be of the essence. CGF, PRES107.

70 In 1962 he spoke of “the great need…for that trilogy, Family, Church and School”.
He and his fellow Trustees would, he promised, work to “create a respect for these principles,
by the community as well as by the individual…” CGF, Chairman’s Report IV (Lisbon, CGF,

71 The Gulbenkian Foundation Inc. was mooted in 1958 and finally set up in 1961 with
a $2 m endowment, initially as part of Trustee Charles Whishaw’s successful negotiation of
not-for-profit status for the Foundation, much of whose income would otherwise have been
liable to taxation in the US. L. G. Denton, Draft Foundation US Tax Memorandum, 19
December 1958. CGF, KLE81. Whishaw was also keen on the idea of establishing a “sister
pp. 205-236).

72 Perdigão would eventually argue that Gulbenkian had deliberately elected not to give
his Foundation “an international character”. CGF, Chairman’s Report IV, p. 196. Foundation
publications continue to propagate the myth that Perdigão had Gulbenkian’s complete
confidence, and that it was primarily “thanks to this lawyer in particular that Calouste
Gulbenkian’s dream was ultimately fulfilled” (CGF, 1999, p. 50).

73 This despite the fact that all books circulated were drawn from a list drawn up by a
1974 Revolution this proximity to the regime led to five functionaries falling victim to Socialist purges, and inspired the formation of an outspoken Board of Foundation Workers that demanded a future say in budgetary matters (Ferreira, 2006, vol. 1, pp.131-143). For a time it seemed that the entire Foundation might be nationalized. By supreme irony, Perdigão was obliged to defend the Foundation by asserting that it was an “international” entity that could, if it wished, spend all its funds abroad while still retaining its Portuguese domicile. The Foundation was not, pace Salazar, a thank-offering to the Portuguese people, but intended to benefit the whole world.

A NEW PHILANTHROPIC MODEL

Back in 1956 Cyril Radcliffe had observed that “in the field which the founder’s money was destined to enrich — culture, science, education, charity — a distinction based upon purely national considerations becomes unreal”. Gulbenkian’s philanthropy began modestly, following that dynastic-commemorative model of charitable giving characteristic of the Armenian elite. It then developed in an entirely new direction. Whereas the former model had focussed on the welfare of the Armenian “nation”, the latter, internationalist model saw the “unreality” of “purely national considerations”. A consummate businessman proud of his mastery of business architecture, Gulbenkian sought to create a foundation that would continue his enviable record of playing governments off against each other, of exploiting temporary partnerships to leverage wealth. Gulbenkian himself saw little difference between nation-states and oil companies. Nation-states were just so many players at the table, parties to a negotiation, rather than social or political environments. In the last surviving letter (of June 1953) discussing his vision, Gulbenkian dismissed Radcliffe’s proposed defensive strategy, by which the Foundation’s board would have included representatives of two nations (Britain and Portugal), neither of whom would therefore be in a position to capture the Foundation for one nation. Gulbenkian felt his humanitarian vision was so broad that such associations would only hamper it. “After giving the problem mature consideration”, he wrote, “I came to the

74 Perdigão argued in some desperation that the workers did not have the authority to make the Foundation comply with its demands. In the wake of the revolution “the resulting revolutionary power belonged, in its origin, to the Armed Forces, and the fact that the people supported the revolution enthusiastically did not mean that the Armed Forces had transferred to them the revolutionary power which was theirs and theirs alone”. CGF, Chairman’s Report IV (Lisbon, CGF, 1980, p. 27).

75 Radcliffe to Perdigão, 27 February 1956, Gulbenkian (1965, p. 335), original CGF, Box 2, RAD 262.
Calouste Gulbenkian’s founding vision for the Gulbenkian Foundation

conclusion that to bring in governments for the realisation of so ambitious a scheme, would trespass my power [sic]76. He would try to ignore them.

Unfortunately, due to his aforementioned nervousness of committing details of his vision to paper, our ability to reconstruct it is limited. In the absence of letters or notes by Gulbenkian from the period between June 1953 and his death, the historian is obliged to fall back on the correspondence of those around him, and in particular to assess the relative reliability of Radcliffe, Nubar, Essayan, and Perdigão as witnesses to the philanthropist’s intentions. In proposing conclusions it is important to bear these facts in mind. This essay concludes that Perdigão’s direction of the Foundation did not reflect Gulbenkian’s wishes as expressed in the surviving letters penned by Gulbenkian himself. Nor did it reflect second-hand accounts recorded by the others’, whose relations with Gulbenkian were, I contend, more intimate and deeply-rooted than Perdigão’s was. Perdigão collaborated with Salazar to capture the foundation for Portugal.

Whether Perdigão did so willingly or against his better judgment is beyond the scope of this study. What is clear is that Gulbenkian’s vision was ahead of its time. He anticipated the philanthropic paradigm shift brought about by Gates. Gulbenkian shaped a new, oil-based international economic order, Bill Gates organized one around the personal computer. In both cases dominance of the “new economy” as well as unimaginable personal wealth caused them to court unpopularity, charges of uncompetitive practices, and threats of regulatory intervention. Had Gulbenkian lived longer, he, not Gates, would have been the first billionaire to step back from day-to-day running of a business empire and devote his energies to a new model of philanthropy that imitated business rather than expiating it.

Gulbenkian’s close friend and admirer, Radcliffe, struggled in vain to realize that vision, but was not willing to compromise with Salazar’s demands. Perdigão was, and took Essayan with him. Nubar Gulbenkian tried to continue Radcliffe’s fight, but eventually gave up. Whether this had anything to do with a financial settlement reached out of court between him and the Foundation remains unclear77. Ultimately Radcliffe, Perdigão, Nubar,

76 In the same letter he also states that though his foundation would officially be based in Lisbon “the mind and the management” will be in London. Gulbenkian to Radcliffe, 11 June 1953, FCG, RAD475. A search of Gulbenkian’s subsequent correspondence to Radcliffe, Perdigão and others in the archives of the FCG has failed to discover any later statements on the Foundation’s vision. This is perhaps due to factors noted above, including the dispute with Nubar as well as poor health.

77 Nubar had brought the case in a Lisbon court. According to Perdigão’s account, he received “a capital commutation of the income of the trusts which his father during his lifetime and by will had instituted in his favour and which would have provided him with an annuity of S$135,000” (CGF, Chairman’s Report I, p. 16).
Jonathan Conlin

Essayan, and Salazar all bear some responsibility for what happened. So, of course, does Calouste Gulbenkian himself, for failing to explain his intentions in time. This is not to deny the invaluable work that the Foundation achieved under the eye of the Salazarist regime. Although little known outside its home, Portugal, to all but the most casual visitor to Lisbon the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation is a mandatory stop: it not only owns the city’s finest art collection, it runs a Centre for Contemporary Art, an orchestra, choir and other arts initiatives, giving it a profile unmatched by any similar organization in any other world city. Before the 1974 Revolution and European subsidies changed it forever, when Portugal was still isolated by the world’s contempt for Salazar’s dictatorship, the Gulbenkian Foundation’s significance in national life was even greater.

The Foundation’s financial profile is also distinctive in several ways. It has retained its founder’s interests in oil exploration, rather than divesting and diversifying its portfolio. Despite the forced nationalizations of the 1970s, these assets still provide around a fifth of the Foundation’s annual income, and represent approximately a quarter of its total €3.4 billion in assets. The Gulbenkian Foundation also stands out from entities such as the Rockefeller Foundation in the low proportion of grants made outside the home country (just 15%). Whereas foundations in the United States are legally required to spend 5% of their capital annually to ensure that they do not become permanent, the Gulbenkian Foundation is committed to capital growth in line with nominal GDP. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the Foundation’s current investment strategy. As should hopefully be clear by now, this combination of aggressive investment abroad and direct philanthropy at home itself reflects a conflict of vision that dates back more than fifty years, before it was even determined where the Foundation’s “home” should be.

The decree law that established the Foundation in July 1956 has a preamble, in which Salazar praised Calouste Gulbenkian’s generosity to Portugal.

He fully appreciated the calm enjoyed amongst us, and valued the stability of the institutions and social balance which reflect our character; he knew also the extent to which a founder’s wishes, in similar cases, are respected

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78 At least one Trustee was gently urging the Foundation’s divestment as early as 1956, arguing that a high-risk investment strategy had been perfectly acceptable “for Mr Gulbenkian as a private individual [who] had responsibility to no-one but himself” but was less appropriate for a charity. “Would we be justified however, if a good price was offered, in continuing our holding rather than consolidating our capital and spreading our interests rather more widely?” Whishaw to Perdigão, 31 December 1956, CGF, PRES96. Despite bemoaning the sector’s volatility in almost every annual report, Perdigão elected not to pull out.

79 Assets at 31 December 2007. My thanks to Martin Essayan for this information.
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in Portugal. The decision he made was indeed an act of faith and of confidence\(^80\).

Happily there is still time to show that this faith and confidence were, after all, well placed.

It has become common to speak of humanitarian and philanthropic organizations as representing a “Third Sector”, in addition to the private and state sectors. The story of Gulbenkian’s attempt to colonize this sector reminds us of the extent to which its borders, and perhaps even its very existence, remain heavily inflected by political actors and by contemporary business practices. It is this fact which makes the history of philanthropy such a rewarding subject for scholarship. Given the lack of secondary scholarship of the sort that looks beyond a single institution or group of institutions in a particular country, it is to be hoped that more work will be done to expose broader patterns and convergences.

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